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ABSTRACT

Behavioral public choice is the study of irrationality among political
actors. In this context, irrationality means systematic bias, a deviation from
rational expectations, or some other departure from economists' conception of
rationality. Behavioral public choice scholars extend the insights of behavioral
economics to the political realm and show that irrational behavior is an
important source of government failure. This Article makes an original
contribution to the legal literature by systematically reviewing the findings of
behavioral public choice and explaining their implications for the law and legal
institutions. We discuss the various biases and heuristics that lead political
actors to support and adopt bad laws and describe how irrationality influences
specific areas of the law, including tax, antitrust, consumer protection,
corporate, and employment law. We also discuss various proposals for
minimizing the effects of irrationality on public policy. Our goal is to introduce
this new field of research to legal scholars, most of whom have previously
ignored it. Familiarity with behavioral public choice will help legal scholars
better understand the types of policies that are likely to emerge from real-world
political processes and will facilitate efforts to promote realistic policy reform.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars in the emerging field of behavioral public choice study
irrationality' among political actors, including voters, and analyze its

I
For purposes of this Article, we define irrationality as systematic bias, a deviation from
rational expectations, or some other departure from economists' conception of rationality. This
definition is consistent with the way in which the term is used in the behavioral public choice
literature. For further discussion on this point, see infra Part II.
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consequences for political decision making.2 Their research explains many
otherwise puzzling aspects of law and policy. For example, many economists
and economically oriented legal scholars argue that a carbon tax is the most
efficient policy for addressing global warming.3 Yet opinion research indicates
that the public strongly prefers less efficient forms of regulation such as fuel
economy standards.4 As we explain later, the behavioral public choice literature
explains why the public disagrees with economists on this important issue.5
A second example, drawn from recent headlines, pertains to statements
made by Jonathan Gruber about the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Gruber is a
prominent health economist and former adviser to the Obama administration.
At an academic conference, Gruber described the reasons that Congress
incorporated into the ACA a complex scheme that conceals both the law's cost
as well as who pays for the healthcare subsidies that allow low-income persons
to purchase health insurance through the ACA's insurance exchanges.6 Gruber
stated bluntly that the ACA's "[f]ack of transparency is a huge political
advantage" and argued that due to the "stupidity of the American voter," a
more transparent funding scheme would likely have precluded Congress from
adopting the law.7 While Gruber's crude comments ignited a firestorm of
Some scholars refer to this field of study as behavioral political economy rather than
behavioral public choice. See, e.g., Niclas Berggren, Time for BehavioralPoliticalEconomy? An
Analysis ofArticles in Behavioral Economics, 25 REv. AUSTRIAN ECON. 199, 199 (2012). Labels
aside, this Article focuses on irrationality among political actors, which sometimes leads to
government failure as defined infra Part II. We distinguish our subject matter from behavioral
economics, which focuses on irrationality among market actors and uses evidence of it to justify
paternalistic government intervention. E.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009).
For an explanation of why emissions fees, including carbon taxes, are more efficient than
2

command-and-control regulations, see HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 86-88,

94-96 (8th ed. 2008).
4

FREDERICK MAYER ET AL., NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, AMERICANS

THINK

THE

CLIMATE

IS

CHANGING

AND

SUPPORT

SOME

ACTIONS

2-4

(2013),

http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edulsites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-01 0.pdf (finding that
over 60% of adults support regulations on power plants and factories and requiring more fuelefficient cars, but only 29% support a carbon tax); Anthony Leiserowitz, Climate Change Risk
Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values, 77 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 45, 55-56 (2006) (finding strong support for vehicle fuel economy standards and similar
regulations, but finding strong opposition to addressing global warming via a gas tax or business
energy tax); Matthew C. Nisbet & Teresa Myers, The Polls-Trends: Twenty Years of Public
Opinion About Global Warming, 71 PUB. OPINION Q. 444, 460-68 (2007) (discussing evidence
that the public strongly supports government regulation in response to global warming, but is
much less supportive of taxes on electricity and gasoline).
See infra Part III.
Jose A. DelReal, ObamacareConsultant Under Firefor "Stupidity of the American Voter"
Comment, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/
wp/2014/1 1/1 1/obamacare-consultant-under-fire-for-stupidity-of-the-american-voter-comment/.
Id.
6
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controversy, research in behavioral public choice supports his claim that
Congress is more likely to adopt expensive legislation (such as the ACA) if its
congressional sponsors construct it so as to conceal costs and who has to pay
them.8
As these examples make clear, behavioral public choice is highly
relevant to legal scholarship. Yet most legal scholars have ignored it. This
Article attempts to remedy that problem by systematically reviewing the
findings of behavioral public choice and discussing their implications for the
law and legal institutions.9 Our goal is to introduce legal scholars to behavioral
public choice and to stimulate their involvement in future research.
Behavioral public choice is both an extension of and a reaction to
behavioral economics and its counterpart in legal scholarship, behavioral law
and economics.o Psychologists and behavioral economists have documented
imperfections in human reasoning, including mental limitations and cognitive
and emotional biases." Their research challenges the rational actor model of
conventional economics, especially the idea that individuals acting in a free
market can make optimal decisions without the government's assistance.
Behavioral economists and legal scholars in the behavioral law and economics
movement have used this research to justify paternalistic government
interventions, including cigarette taxes and consumer protection laws, that are
intended to save people from their own irrational choices. 12 Because of their
8

See infra Part III.

Two economists, Jan Schnellenbach and Christian Schubert, have recently written two
related papers surveying the behavioral public choice literature. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian
Schubert, Behavioral Public Choice: A Survey (Univ. of Freiburg, Working Paper No. 14/03,
2014) [hereinafter Schnellenbach & Schubert, BehavioralPublic Choice]; Jan Schnellenbach
Christian Schubert, BehavioralPolitical Economy: A Survey (Ctr. for Econ. Stud. & Ifo Inst.,
Working Paper No. 4988, 2014). Our Article differs from their work in several ways. First, we
focus specifically on the implications of behavioral public choice for law and legal institutions,
and we view our primary audience as legal scholars and lawyers rather than economists. Second,
our discussion of the biases and heuristics affecting political actors is more detailed. Finally, we
discuss in greater depth the various proposals for coping with irrationality among political actors.
10
For an introduction to behavioral law and economics, see Christine
Jolls et al., A
BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998).
1
E.g., Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
EcoNOMICs 587, 587-703 (John Kagel & Alvin Roth eds., 1995); THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL.,
&

9

HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (2002); Cass R. Sunstein,

Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 1-10 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Jeremy

A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism,35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 30-50 (2007).
12
E.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (2008);
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism,35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 30-50 (2007); Colin
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
"Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211 (2003); Jonathan Gruber, Government
Policy Toward Smoking: A View from Economics, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 119
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CH. L. REv. 1159 (2003).
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focus on market participants and paternalism, most behavioral economists and
behavioral law and economics scholars ignore the possibility that irrationality
also increases the risk of government failure." Behavioral public choice
addresses that oversight by extending the findings of behavioral economics to
the political realm.14
A key insight of behavioral public choice is that people have less
incentive to behave rationally in their capacity as political actors than in their
capacity as market actors. Elections are rarely decided by a single vote, so
voters have little reason to take them seriously. Moreover, the voters,
politicians, and bureaucrats who participate in the political process know that
the costs and benefits of their decisions fall largely upon others. So these
political actors have less at stake than consumers, investors, and other market
participants who make decisions that primarily affect themselves.
Because political actors have little incentive to behave rationally,
irrationality is common in politics, and it has a substantial negative effect on
the law. It frequently causes voters and other political actors to favor policies
that they would not support if they were rational. For example, the economist
Bryan Caplan has presented evidence that the public suffers from "antiforeign
bias, a tendency to underestimate the economic benefits of interaction with
foreigners." 5 Antiforeign bias stems from suspicion of people who are
different, and it creates support for tariffs and other protectionist policies that
reduce social welfare.
In some instances, antiforeign bias and other forms of irrationality
cause government to take action even though the costs of doing so exceed the
benefits. In other instances, government intervention is beneficial but
suboptimal. Suboptimal interventions occur when irrationality influences the
government's choice of policy instruments, which leads to laws that are less
efficient (and perhaps less fair) than alternatives that the government might
otherwise pursue.

13
Some behavioral law and economics scholars have made important contributions to the
study of irrationality among political actors. E.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001); Jolls et al., supra note 10; Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein,
Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, CostBenefit Analysis]. But the behavioral law and economics movement has focused mainly on
irrationality and market failure. In addition to legal scholars, economists also tend to focus on
irrationality and market failure while ignoring government failure. Berggren, supra note 2.
14
See, e.g., Berggren, supra note 2 (stating that behavioral political economy involves the
application of the analytical tools of behavioral economics to political decision makers).
15

BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD

POLICIES 36 (2007) [hereinafter CAPLAN, MYTH] (emphasis omitted); Bryan Caplan, Rational
Ignorance Versus Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3, 15-16 (2001) [hereinafter Caplan,
RationalIrrationality].
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Research in behavioral public choice suggests a cautious approach to
policy making and a healthy skepticism of government action whether it is
motivated by market failures or by paternalism.1 6 By ignoring this research,
legal scholars risk exaggerating the appropriate scope of government as well as
failing to understand the types of policies that are likely to emerge from realworld political processes. Moreover, because the behavioral public choice
literature points to possibilities for improving government decision making, a
lack of familiarity with that literature means that legal scholars will miss
opportunities to promote beneficial policy reforms.
Part II of the Article explains in general terms why irrationality is so
prevalent in and problematic for democratic government. Part III describes
specific types of irrationality that cause government to fail and provides
examples that illustrate how irrationality has led to bad laws. These examples
draw from various areas of law, including tax, antitrust, consumer protection,
corporate, and employment law. Part IV discusses several proposals for coping
with irrationality among political actors and minimizing the damage caused by
it.
II. How IRRATIONALITY CAUSES GOVERNMENT FAILURE

Economists and law and economics scholars use the rational actor
model to analyze legal institutions and legal rules.' 7 According to that model,
"all human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize
their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount
of information and other inputs in a variety of markets." 8 Rational actors also
have rational expectations, meaning that they do not make systematic
mistakes.' 9 People are not omniscient and information is costly, 2 0 so they will
sometimes make poor decisions. But any mistakes attributable to lack of
information will be random and not biased in a particular direction.

16

E.g., James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics: Implications for

Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. REG. EcoN. 41, 43 (2012) ("Our analysis suggests that careful thought
be given to calls for greater state intervention, especially when those calls are directed at firm
biases."); David Hirshleifer, Psychological Bias as a Driver of FinancialRegulation, 14 EUR.

FIN. MGMT. 856, 856 (2008) ("[T]he behavioural approach in some ways strengthensthe case for
laissez-faire, and raises some new doubts about the value of regulation, because much regulation

is driven by psychological bias-on the part of the proponents, not necessarily the regulated.").
17
The discussion in this Part and Part III.A draws upon material first developed in Gary M.
Lucas, Jr., Out ofSight, Out ofMind: How Opportunity Cost Neglect Undermines Democracy, 9

N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 249 (2015) [hereinafter Lucas, Opportunity Cost Neglect].
18

GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH To HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976).

19

On rational expectations, see generally STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS (2d

ed. 1996).
20

See George J. Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213 (1961).
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The rational actor model is useful for various purposes, but
psychological research suggests that it does not always accurately describe
human decision making or behavior. More specifically, psychologists and
behavioral economists have amassed evidence that people suffer from biases
and make use of decision heuristics that cause them to err systematically in
certain circumstances. 2 1 Behavioral public choice examines the implications of
this research for democratic government.
This Part explains in general terms why irrationality is prevalent in a
democracy. It also explains how irrationality causes government failure, which
we define as the deviation of public policy from what it would be in a world
populated by rational, i.e., unbiased, political actors.22 Section A discusses
irrationality among voters, and Section B discusses irrationality among
politicians. We discuss irrationality among bureaucrats in Part IV.
A.

IrrationalityAmong Voters

In an election with many voters, the probability that one vote will
determine the result is virtually zero.23 So voting with the goal of influencing
the outcome makes little sense. Why then do people bother to vote? Some
voters may overestimate the likelihood that their vote will prove decisive.2 4 But
most people vote to comply with a social norm of voting,25 to adhere to the

21

See supra note 11.

22
While this definition suffices for our purposes, we readily acknowledge its limitations. For
example, people's preferences may be subject to framing effects, time inconsistency, and similar
forces, which means that they may not have a single set of fixed policy preferences. An important
objective of future research should be to establish a more compelling and defensible normative
benchmark for assessing policies than the one that we use here. A literature on behavioral welfare
economics is emerging and provides a good starting point. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio
Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with NonstandardDecisionMakers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 7 (Peter Diamond & Hannu
Vartiainen eds., 2007); B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference:
Choice-Theoretic Foundationsfor Behavioral Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. ECON. 51 (2009);
Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant, Eliciting Welfare Preferencesfrom Behavioural Data Sets, 79
REv. OF ECON. STUD. 375 (2012).

23

DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 304-05 (2003).

24

Ingolf Dittman et al., Why Votes Have Value: Instrumental Voting with Overconfidence

and Overestimation of Others' Errors, 84 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 17 (2014); George A.

Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political
Choice, 82 AM. POL. SC. REv. 719, 732-34 (1988). But see Fredrik Carlsson & Olof JohanssonStenman, Why Do You Vote and Vote as You Do?, 63 KYKLOS 495, 501-03 (2010) (suggesting
that this is not likely the reason that most people vote).
25
Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, supra note 24, at 501-03; Gordon Tullock, Some Further
Thoughts on Voting, 104 PUB. CHOICE 181, 181 (2000); cf Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier,
Social Comparisons and Pro-Social Behavior: Testing "Conditional Cooperation" in a Field
Experiment, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 1717, 1720-21 (2004) (finding that students in a field
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demands of morality, to gain a sense of participation in democratic
government, to express their opinion,26 or to be able to truthfully tell others that
they voted.27 In other words, voting confers psychological and reputational
benefits that often outweigh the small cost in terms of time and effort.2 8
Moreover, these benefits, though important, are apparently not large for most
people. Substantial evidence suggests that even small increases in the cost of
voting (in the form of poll taxes, for example) are sufficient to significantly
reduce voter participation.29
The unimportance of a single vote to the outcome of most elections
explains an important feature of voter behavior-altruistic voting. Voters
frequently support policies that they perceive to be in the public interest even
though those policies do not advance their own narrow self-interest.30 Young
voters, for example, express strong support for old-age programs even when
they themselves do not have elderly parents and do not anticipate relying
experiment were more willing to contribute to charity when informed that a large percentage of
other students also contributed).
26
For a recent review of the literature on the importance of a sense of participation as a
motivation to vote, see Schnellenbach & Schubert, BehavioralPublic Choice, supra note 9, at 56. For a review of the expressive voting literature, see id. at 6-10. The utility gained from
expressive voting is analogous to the utility gained from cheering for a sports team. See Geoffrey
Brennan & James Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating PoliticalAlternatives, 28 AM. BEHAV.
Sci. 185, 186-87, 196 (1984).
27
Stefano DellaVigna et al., Voting to Tell Others (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 19832, 2014). For a recent review of the literature on why people vote as well as the
results of a survey that asked voters why they vote, see Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, supra
note 24, at 501-03.
28
For an early discussion of this idea, see William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory
of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 25, 27-28 (1968). For a more recent discussion,
see Tyler Cowen, Self-Deception as the Root of PoliticalFailure, 124 PUB. CHOICE 437, 440-42

(2005). For an argument that emotions provide a strong impetus to vote, see Frans van Winden,
Affective Public Choice, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRACY 45, 54-56

(Jos6 Casas Pardo & Pedro Schwartz eds., 2007).
MUELLER, supra note 23, at 329; ILYA SoMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE:
WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 220 n.23 (2013) [hereinafter SOMIN, SMALLER
GOVERNMENT).
30
E.g., Jack Citrin & Donald Green, The Self-Interest Motive in American Public Opinion, in
29

3 RESEARCH IN MICROPOLITICS 1, 10-17 (Samuel Long ed., 1990); LEIF LEWIN, SELF-INTEREST
AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN WESTERN POLITICS 29-45 (Donald Lavery trans., 1991); David 0. Sears

& Carolyn L. Funk, Self-Interest in Americans' Political Opinions, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST
147 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990); Alan S. Blinder & Alan B. Krueger, What Does the Public
Know About Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It?, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 327, 362-86 (2004); Bryan Caplan, Libertarianism Against Economism: How
Economists Misunderstand Voters, and Why LibertariansShould Care, 5 INDEP. REv. 539 (2001)
[hereinafter Caplan, Economism]; Carolyn L. Funk, The Dual Influence of Self-Interest and
Societal Interest in Public Opinion, 53 POL. RES. Q. 37, 52-54 (2000); Leonie Huddy et al.,
Compassionate Politics: Support for Old-Age Programs Among the Non-Elderly, 22 POL.
PSYCHOL. 443 (2001).
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heavily on these programs when they retire.31 More generally, political party
identification is not strongly associated with income.32 Both major political
parties attract voters across the income scale despite the perception among
some scholars and other elites that Democrats favor policies that would
33
disproportionately benefit the poor.
Altruistic voting conflicts with evidence that suggests that people are
generally selfish. 34 Americans donate only about two percent of their incomes
to charitable purposes.3 ' The question arises then why people appear to be more
generous when acting as voters than in their private lives.
Scholars have proffered two explanations. First, altruism is a
consumption good that confers psychological and reputational benefits.3 6 In
addition, because a single vote rarely matters, altruism in voting has almost no
cost for the individual voter. As one scholar put it, "[v]oting to raise your taxes
by a thousand dollars when your probability of decisiveness is 1 in 100,000 has
an expected cost of a penny." 3 7 So voters are willing to support policies (and
the politicians who advocate them) even when those policies are contrary to the
voters' self-interest. This means that "we should expect voters to 'stuff
themselves' with moral rectitude." 3 8 Voting to promote the public interest
confers the benefits of altruism but at a much lower personal cost than donating
your own time and money to charity.
Second, because of the insignificance of a single vote, the personal
consequences of many policies are not salient for voters. Moreover, "when the
cost and benefits are obscure, support becomes increasingly unrelated to the

31

Huddy et al., supra note 30, at 444, 451-62.

Caplan, Economism, supra note 30, at 543.
Alan Abramowitz found that after controlling for race, income had minimal impact on the
decision to vote for Barack Obama or Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election. Alan I.
Abramowitz, The Minimal Class Divide in American Politics: Why Growing Economic
Inequality Does Not Explain PartisanPolarization, SABATO'S CRYSTAL BALL (May 1, 2014),
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/the-minimal-class-divide-in-americanpolitics/ ("African Americans, regardless of income, voted overwhelmingly for Barack Obama.
Whites with family incomes of greater than $150,000 were only slightly more likely to vote for
Mitt Romney than whites with family incomes of less than $30,000.").
We generally agree that "altruism toward blood relatives in proportion to shared genetic
34
inheritance [is] an expression of self-interest." Caplan, Economism, supra note 30; see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 310-11 (1995) [hereinafter EPSTEIN,
32

33

SIMPLE RULES] (making a similar argument).
3
Suzanne Perry, The Stubborn 2% Giving Rate, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (June 17,
2013), https://philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubbom-2-Giving-Rate/139811/.
36
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 150. Voting altruistically may help a person maintain a
positive self-image.
Id. at 150; see also Gordon Tullock, Charity of the Uncharitable, 9 WESTERN EcoN. J. 379,
3
388-89 (1971) (making a similar argument).
38
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 151.
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personal 'price.""' This hypothesis explains why the few instances in which
researchers have found that self-interest plays a significant role in voter's
policy judgments usually involve policies for which the effects on particular
voters are "1. visible, 2. tangible, 3. large, and 4. certain."4 0 In particular, David
Sears and Carolyn Funk argue that self-interest influences taxpayer support for
tax cuts that are large and highly publicized and where the benefit to particular
taxpayers is clear. 4 1 But in general, Sears and Funk find that the "public thinks
about most political issues, most of the time, in a disinterested frame of
mind."4

2

In a world populated by rational voters, altruistic voting would have
desirable effects. Altruistic voters support the policies and politicians they
believe will maximize social welfare. Of course, even if they are rational, these
voters might make mistakes. In particular, because one vote is usually
unimportant and gathering information is costly, rational voters may remain
"rationally ignorant" about politics. 4 3 Indeed, for most voters, the cost of

gathering and processing political information appears to exceed any benefits
(psychological or otherwise) that might result from becoming informed."
While some voters are informed, e.g., because political information is relevant
to their jobs or because they view politics as a hobby, empirical evidence
confirms that the typical voter is not, and many voters are woefully ignorant.45
Democracy suffers from a collective action problem. An informed
electorate is a public good, so each voter has an incentive to free ride on the
knowledge of others.46 He can enjoy the benefits of an informed electorate
without becoming informed himself. In addition, he has no incentive to become
informed because his efforts are unlikely to make any difference. Given that his
vote will not affect the outcome, even a voter who is civic-minded or who cares

3
40
41
42

43

Citrin & Green, supra note 30, at 18.
Id.
Sears & Funk, supra note 30, at 159-70.
Id. at 170.
For a recent review of the vast literature on rational ignorance, see SOMIN,
29, at 62-89.

SMALLER

GOVERNMENT, supra note

4
Cf Michael Wallerstein, BehavioralEconomics and PoliticalEconomy, 30 NORDIC J. POL.
ECON. 37, 46 (2004) ("Voters are rational not to invest in acquiring information about politics,
unless they derive enjoyment from following the twists and turns of political competition.").
45
E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 5 (2004) ("If six decades
of modern public opinion research establish anything, it is that the general public's political
ignorance is appalling by any standard."); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & ScoTr KEETER, WHAT
AMERICANS KNow ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62-104 (1996); SoMWN, SMALLER
GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 17-61; Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational
Public and Democracy, in RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 35, 37-39 (George E.
Marcus & Russell L . Hanson eds., 1993).

46

SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT,

supra note 29, at 64.
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deeply about his fellow citizens has little reason to seek political knowledge.4 7
He can contribute more to society by devoting his time to charitable activities
than to gathering and processing political information.
Rational ignorance might cause voters to favor politicians and policies
that they would oppose if they had complete information. That said, rational
ignorance may be less harmful than many scholars assume.48 To see why,
imagine an election between Smith and Jones. Assume that Smith is the better
candidate, but many voters do not know this for certain because they are
rationally ignorant. These voters must guess randomly in choosing between the
two. Because the voters are rational, their guesses will not be biased in favor of
either candidate. If the electorate is large, the two candidates will split evenly
the vote of the rationally ignorant. Fortunately, as we already mentioned, not all
voters are ignorant. The informed voters will know which candidate is better,
and they will break the resulting tie in favor of Smith-a laudable outcome.
As this example illustrates, because rationality means lack of
systematic bias, rationally ignorant voters will make only random errors that
tend to offset each other in the aggregate. This means that informed voters,
even if they are few in number, will have disproportionate influence over
government policy. 49 In effect, their views will prevail, a result that some
scholars refer to as the miracle of aggregation.so

47
We believe that psychological and reputational benefits play a significant role in
motivating people to vote. But we acknowledge that people might vote for instrumental reasons

if they are altruistic and value the welfare of their fellow citizens. In that case, the benefits of
voting would include the expected value to the entire nation of victory by the individual voter's
preferred candidate. The altruistic voter would discount the benefits to others insofar as he does
not value the welfare of others as much as his own. Nonetheless, the expected benefits of voting

would be much larger than if the voter were purely self-interested. They might in fact be large
enough so that instrumental voting is rational even if the probability of influencing the outcome
is quite small. We are not convinced that this sort of cost-benefit reasoning explains why so
many people vote. But even if instrumental voting is rational for this reason, it is unlikely that

becoming informed would also be rational. As we argue in the text, the cost of voting is quite
small relative to the cost of becoming informed. So it could be rational to vote, but not rational to
become informed. Regardless, the empirical evidence shows that voters are generally
uninformed. For further discussion of this point, see SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note

29, at 63-71.
48

DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

ARE EFFICIENT 1 (1995).

49

A potential problem with this view is that the small group of informed voters is not

demographically representative of the electorate, so they may have different priorities or be
influenced by racial prejudice. SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 113.

5o

This phenomenon is also referred to as the wisdom of crowds. For a recent review of the

literature on this topic, see Joseph P. Simmons et al., Intuitive Biases in Choice Versus
Estimation:Implicationsfor the Wisdom of the Crowds, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 1-2 (2011); see
also HtLtNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE
RULE OF THE MANY 145-66 (2013); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2005); Philip

E. Converse, PopularRepresentationand the Distribution of Information, in INFORMATION AND
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Moreover, rational voters, even if they are uninformed, should not be
vulnerable to propaganda. They will be skeptical of well-informed political
actors who have a motive to deceive them, and they will rationally discount
self-serving messages communicated by special interest groups and the
politicians who represent those groups.5 ' The economist Gary Becker has made
a similar point:
I find it difficult to believe that most voters are systematically
fooled about the effects of policies like quotas and tariffs that
have persisted for a long time. I prefer instead to assume that
voters have unbiased expectations, at least of policies that have
persisted. They may overestimate the dead weight loss from
some policies, and underestimate it from others, but on the
average they have a correct perception.5 2
In sum, a strong case can be made that democracy will work well even
if most voters know little about politics as long as voters are also rational.
Altruistic voters support policies that they perceive to be in the public interest,
and rationality ensures that voters' judgments are not systematically biased.
The problem with this story is that voters are not rational. The
behavioral economics and behavioral public choice literature generally defines

DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 369, 377-85 (John J. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990); Tom
Hoffman, Rationality Reconceived: The Mass Electorate and Democratic Theory, 12 CRITICAL

REV. 459, 470 (1998); Page & Shapiro, supra note 45, at 40-41. For critiques of the miracle of
aggregation, see SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 110-16; Bryan Caplan,
Majorities Against Utility: Implications of the Failure of the Miracle of Aggregation, 26 Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 198 (2009) [hereinafter Caplan, Majorities Against Utility]. The Condorcet Jury
Theorem is related to the miracle of aggregation. It shows that the probability that a majority will
reach the correct outcome in an election increases with the number of voters if we assume that
each voter is at least slightly more likely to vote for the better candidate than the worse one. See
WITTMAN, supra note 48, at 15-17; David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information
Aggregation, Rationality, andthe CondorcetJury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 34, 34 (1996);
Sven Berg, Condorcet's Jury Theorem, Dependency Among Jurors, 10 Soc. CHOICE & WELFARE
87 (1993); Krishna K. Ladha, Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Light of de Finetti's Theorem:
Majority-Rule Voting with Correlated Votes, 10 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 69 (1993).
Unfortunately, the Condorcet Jury Theorem does not suggest that democracy will function well if
voters are irrational. For a critique, see SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 116-17.
51
See WITrMAN, supra note 48, at 15; see also Reiner Eichenberger & Angel Serna, Random
Errors, Dirty Information, and Politics, 86 PUB. CHOICE 137, 142 (1996) (arguing that
"systematic errors [by voters] are inconsistent with rational expectations").
52
Gary Becker, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation: Comment, 19 J.L. & ECON.
245, 246 (1976); see also GEORGE STIGLER, Economics or Ethics?, in THE ESSENCE OF STIGLER

303, 309 (Kurt R. Leube & Thomas Gale Moore eds., 1986) ("[T]he assumption that public
policy has often been inefficient because it was based on mistaken views has little to commend it.
To believe, year after year, decade after decade, that the protective tariffs or usury laws to be
found in most lands are due to confusion rather than purposeful action is singularly
obfuscatory.").
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irrationality as bias or a deviation from rational expectations.53 In this sense,
voters regularly exhibit irrationality. For example, as we mentioned in the
Introduction, voters suffer from antiforeign bias, which causes them to support
harmful economic protectionism. Another source of voter bias is the
availability heuristic, which is the tendency to estimate the importance and
frequency of an event based upon how easy it is to recall examples of it.5 4 The
availability heuristic focuses the public's attention on problems that receive
significant media coverage, which causes the government to neglect more
important but less newsworthy issues. 5
Irrational voter behavior should come as no surprise. 6 Empirical
evidence suggests that as the cost of irrationality decreases, decision making
becomes less rational. Rationally evaluating new information requires effort,
and failure to exert that effort increases the influence of various biases. 8 Given
the low personal stakes involved, voters have little incentive to think rationally.
In particular, voters have less incentive to recognize their irrationality and to
find ways to overcome it than do private actors making decisions that directly
affect themselves and their families. In other words, "[t]he same people who
practice intellectual self-discipline when they figure out how to commute to
work, repair a car, buy a house, or land a job 'let themselves go' when they
contemplate the effects of protectionism, gun control, or pharmaceutical
regulation." 9 Moreover, "voting for bad policies has a built-in negative

5
E.g., CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 98-99; Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 857
("[R]ational ignorance alone cannot explain systematic bias. It cannot explain why voters would
continually make the same mistakes, such as approving protectionism and farm subsidies."); Jolls
et al., supra note 10, at 1473-74.
54
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974).
5
See infra Part Ill.B.
56
Cf Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 J. PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 106, 111-12 (2006) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax] ("The
general complexity of the subject matter; the low benefits for any individual to obtain on a
personal level from fully understanding it; the absence of any general, widely available
mechanism to educate people about tax; and the lack of incentives for lawmakers to implement
any debiasing or arbitrage mechanism can all be expected to, if anything, make the usual
heuristics and biases more acute in the field of tax.").
57
See infra Part IV.B.3.
58
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOw 31-49 (2011).
5

CAPLAN, MYTH,

supra note 15, at 133; cf

JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,

AND DEMOCRACY 262 (1942) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM] ("[T]he typical citizen

drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He
argues and analyzes in a way he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real
interests. He becomes a primitive again.").
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externality" because most of the costs of those policies will be borne by other
people.o
Voter irrationality is not only prevalent, it is also important. It biases
elections and government policy. Returning to our hypothetical election, if
uninformed voters are biased in favor of Jones, then the better candidate
(Smith) may lose. Moreover, Jones can win even if only a small group of voters
are irrationally biased in his favor. To see why, assume that the electorate
consists of one million voters.6 1 Assume also that the votes of 990,000 of them
cancel out. This might occur because these voters are unbiased and choose
randomly or because the biases of individual voters offset in the sense that they
cause some voters to favor Jones but just as many to favor Smith. Under these
circumstances, the remaining 10,000 voters will decide the election. If just
6,000 of them are biased in Jones's favor, then Jones will almost certainly win.
In other words, 6,000 biased voters in an electorate of one million can be
enough to tilt the election in favor of the inferior candidate.
This analysis shows that despite their good intentions, altruistic voters
may cause government to fail by introducing systematic bias into the
policymaking process.6 2 As a result, even if politicians generally give voters
what they want, government may fail to promote the public interest. Voters will
support harmful policies that they would not favor if they were rational.63 For
example, the availability heuristic sometimes leads the public to demand costly
regulation of highly publicized risks even when scientists believe that those
risks are minimal and not worth addressing.
In addition, irrationality opens up an opportunity for politicians,
bureaucrats, and special interest groups to take advantage of voters. Irrational
voters may not rationally discount propaganda and other appeals to emotion,
making them susceptible to deceptive forms of persuasion.

60
61

Caplan, Majorities Against Utility, supra note 50, at 207-08.
This hypothetical is based on an example found in SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra

note 29, at 116.
62

CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 152-53.

63

Cf Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 554 (2002) ("A key lesson of cognitive
psychology is that even people with good motives tend to make bad choices in certain,
predictable circumstances.").
6

CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 178-79; Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger,

&

Anomalies in Political Economy, 68 PUB. CHOICE 71, 78-79 (1991) [hereinafter Frey
Eichenberger, Anomalies]; Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 857 ("[C]ertain beliefs about regulation
are especially good at exploiting psychological biases to attract attention and support.");
McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra note 56, at 128 ("Our findings further suggest
that politicians more skilled at framing public political issues such as tax will have more success
in both getting elected and advancing their agendas than those not so skilled."); van Winden,
supra note 28, at 55 (arguing that emotionally intelligent politicians can appeal to the public's
emotions to gamer support for their policy proposals); cf ScoTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
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B. IrrationalityAmong Politicians
The fact that voters have irrational policy preferences is important
because public opinion significantly influences government policy.65
Nonetheless, politicians have some slack to deviate from what voters want and
to implement the politicians' own preferred policies. One source of slack is a
lack of vigilance on the part of voters who may simply be unaware of the laws
that politicians adopt. In addition, rather than focusing on policy, some voters
become distracted by seemingly irrelevant personal attributes of political
candidates, e.g., physical attractiveness.66 Moreover, charismatic politicians can
influence voters' policy preferences. In particular, voters sometimes modify
their beliefs simply because they trust a politician ("I believe because he said
it.") or because a politician is an eloquent speaker ("I believe because he said it
so well.").6 7

If voters were rational, slack among politicians would arguably be
undesirable because it would undermine democratic self-governance. But
because voters are not rational, public-spirited politicians might use their slack
to save the public from itself. Paradoxically, by refusing to adhere to the
public's misguided policy preferences, politicians might cause democracy to

JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 65-68 (1993) (presenting evidence that responses to public

opinion polls depend greatly on how questions and answers are framed and concluding that
"[wihen people do not have deep convictions about an issue, they respond to 'catch phrases' that
point them in a socially desirable direction").
65
E.g., ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 45, at 9-10; SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra
note 29, at 6, 97; JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: How PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES
AMERICAN POLITICS 9 (2004); Blinder & Krueger, supra note 30, at 328.
66
Niclas Berggren et al., The Looks of a Winner: Beauty and Electoral Success, 94 J. PUB.

ECON. 8 (2010); Amy King & Andrew Leigh, Beautiful Politicians, 62 KYKLOS 579 (2009);
Gabriel S. Lenz & Chappell Lawson, Looking the Part: Television Leads Less Informed Citizens
to Vote Based on Candidates'Appearance, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 574, 574 (2011). One study finds
that election outcomes can be predicted with alarming success based upon study subjects'
judgments about the two candidates' competence determined after viewing pictures of them for
only one second. Alexander Todorov et al., Inferences of Competence from Faces Predict

Election Outcomes, 308 SCIENCE 1623, 1624 (2005). Psychologists who study persuasion
contrast the peripheral route to attitude change with the central route. Whereas the central route

focuses on the quality of arguments, the peripheral route focuses on superficial aspects of a
message such as the attractiveness or fame of the source or the number of arguments. These

superficial factors are more likely to persuade people for whom the message is not personally
relevant (because they are not motivated to process it deeply) and who do not have the ability to
process it, e.g., because they lack the knowledge or time. THOMAS GILOVICH
PSYCHOLOGY 281-93 (Sheri Snavely ed., 3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter GILOVICH
PSYCHOLOGY]. As discussed in Part II.A., the typical voter lacks both the
knowledge to process political information deeply, so it is not surprising that

ET AL., SOCIAL
ET AL., SOCIAL
motivation and
peripheral cues

such as the beauty of politicians play a significant role in political persuasion.
67
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 170. A third important source of slack exists if voters
underestimate the ability of politicians to control administrative agencies. See infra Part IV.
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work better. Similarly, a charismatic politician could use his political skills to
persuade voters that their biases cause them to support policies that, though
well-intentioned, are not consistent with the public interest.6 8
There are, however, several reasons to believe that slack among
politicians cannot save democracy from an irrational public. First, while
politicians have some slack to pursue their own agenda, their ability to defy
voters is limited. In particular, politicians can probably ignore voters with
respect to issues that do not arouse intense public interest. But when voters care
deeply about an issue, they will punish politicians who shirk. Second,
politicians might use their slack to promote the public interest, but they might
also abuse it and cater to the demands of special interest groups that support
their campaigns or supply them with bribes.70
Finally, politicians themselves may be irrational and therefore unable
to identify policies that are in the public interest. No reason exists to believe
that politicians are immune to the biases that afflict ordinary citizens. On the
one hand, politicians do have a strong personal incentive to think rationally
about matters that affect their chances of winning an election.71 On the other
hand, they often have no greater incentive than voters to identify and oppose
bad policies. After all, the adverse consequences of those policies fall primarily
on other people. Moreover, selection pressure favors politicians who share the
same biases as the public. 72 Not only will their message resonate, but these
politicians will appear more genuine than will rational, well-informed

68

Cf WITTMAN, supra note 48, at 10 (arguing that political entrepreneurs are rewarded for

providing the public with new information).
69
Id. at 20-30; Paul Burstein, The Impact ofPublic Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and
an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29, 36 (2003) ("Public opinion affects policy three-quarters of the
times its impact is gauged; its effect is of substantial policy importance at least a third of the
time, and probably a fair amount more."); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, Out of
Office: ElectoralAccountability and House Members' Voting, 96 AM. POL. SU. REv. 127, 138
(2002) ("[W]e show that, holding district ideology constant, in every election between 1956 and
1996 an incumbent's vote share decreased the more he voted with the extreme of his party . .
[and] the probability [of reelection] decreases significantly as an incumbent's voting support for
his party increases."). But see Steven D. Levitt, How Do Senators Vote? Disentanglingthe Role
of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology, 86 AM. EcoN. REv. 425, 438
(1996) (concluding that "ideology is the primary determinant" of voting patterns for U.S.
senators, that "[1]ess than one quarter of the weight in the [senator's] decision function is devoted
to voter preferences," and that senators pay more attention to what voters want in election years
and when the senator holds a marginal seat).
70
ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 45, at 79-80 ("When a politician believes that her
conduct will gain broad attention back home, interest group pressures will be attenuated....
Interest groups are far more powerful when the general public is asleep."); CAPLAN, MYTH, supra
note 15, at 180 ("Do what the public wants when it cares; take bids from interested parties when
its [sic] doesn't.").
71

CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 167.

72

Id. at 168.

2015])

BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC CHOICE

215

politicians who recognize bad policies but pretend otherwise in order to get
elected. In the words of Thomas Sowell,
When most voters do not think beyond stage one, many elected
officials have no incentive to weigh what the consequences
would be in later stages-and considerable incentives to avoid
getting beyond what their constituents think and understand,
for fear that rival politicians can drive a wedge between them
and their constituents by catering to short-run public
perceptions. 73
An important qualification to this analysis stems from the fact that
voters not only support candidates who share their policy preferences, but they
also focus on outcomes in deciding for whom to cast their votes. 74 This means
that politicians seeking reelection must balance the need to give voters the
policies that they want against the need to avoid noticeably bad outcomes
before the next election.75 In particular, politicians need to avoid policies that
will substantially damage the economy in the near future.76
To illustrate the benefits of outcome-based voting, consider President
Obama's reversal on trade policy.7 7 Because of antiforeign bias, the public
favors economic protectionism despite opposition from economists across the
political spectrum.
Perhaps as a result of strong public support for
protectionism, during the 2008 presidential campaign, President Obama
promised to renegotiate existing free trade agreements.79 But after winning the

7

THOMAS SOWELL, APPLIED EcoNoMIcs: THINKING BEYOND STAGE ONE 4 (2d ed. 2004).

74

SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 100-05. Political scientists use the term

retrospective voting to refer to voting based on outcomes rather than policy preferences. See, e.g.,
Wayne L. Francis et al., Retrospective Voting and PoliticalMobility, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 999
(1994); David J. Lanoue, Retrospective Voting and Prospective Voting in Presidential-Year
Elections, 47 POL. RES. Q. 193 (1994); Brad Lockerbie, The Influence ofLevels ofInformation on
the Use of ProspectiveEvaluations, 13 POL. BEHAv. 223 (1991); Richard Nadeau & Michael S.
Lewis-Beck, NationalEconomic Voting in U.S. PresidentialElections, 63 J. POL. 159 (2001).
7
See SOMN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 103.
76
For a formal analysis of the tradeoff involved in promoting economic growth while also
catering to voters' biased economic beliefs, see Ivo Bischoff & Lars-H.R. Siemers, Biased
Beliefs and Retrospective Voting: Why Democracies Choose Mediocre Policies, 156 PUB.
CHOICE 163, 175 (2013) (arguing that politicians respond to this tradeoff by choosing a mix of
good and bad, but popular, economic policies, which leads to mediocre outcomes).
n

SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 59.

7
An overwhelming majority of economists agree that the United States should eliminate
tariffs and other trade barriers. Robert Whaples, Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes!, 3
EcoN. VOICE 1, 1 (2006).
7
Susan Ferrechio, Obama Backs Away from Reforming Free Trade Deal, WASH. EXAMINER
(May 17, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obama-backs-away-fromreforming-free-trade-deal/article/99602.
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election, the President changed his position, and he did so apparently because
of concerns that protectionism would exacerbate the global economic crisis.so
The President suffered little if any political damage from failing to follow
through on his campaign promise, and he was reelected by a comfortable
margin. Most probably, the public was simply unaware that he broke his
promise.81 This provides a nice example of how a rational politician concerned
about reelection can use his slack to avoid irrational policies.
Despite this example, outcome-based voting is no panacea for the
effects of irrationality on democracy. On the one hand, politicians concerned
about outcomes may save voters from themselves by refusing to adopt policies
that voters irrationally support and that would have obvious harmful effects. On
the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests that voters cannot adequately
assess politicians' performance. Voters frequently do not have enough political
knowledge to determine which problems government policy can feasibly
address, which politicians are responsible for what issues, and whether
alternative policies would have been more desirable than the ones that
incumbent office holders actually adopted.82 In particular, voters tend to reward
or punish politicians for changes in conditions (particularly economic
conditions) over which politicians have little or no control.83 Voters also have
biased views as to what constitutes a good outcome, e.g., equating passing
legislation to a good outcome regardless of the new law's consequences.84
Moreover, many of the irrational policies that voters demand produce bad
outcomes that are delayed in time or that are otherwise difficult to observe. For
this reason, short-sighted politicians focused on the next election are likely to
acquiesce in these policies, especially if they can plausibly deny responsibility
for their effects." Finally, if, as seems likely, voters are biased in favor of

so

Id.; Jonathan Weisman, Obama, in Canada, Warns Against Protectionism, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 20, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123504260038621641.
81
SoMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 59.
82
Id. at 40-43, 100-05.
83
Id. at 100-03; Wallerstein, supra note 44, at 44-45 (citing evidence that voters punish
incumbent politicians for natural disasters and other events that are completely outside the
incumbents' control). In some cases, this phenomenon may result from hindsight bias, which is
the tendency, after an outcome has occurred, to view it as having been easily predictable when it
in fact was not. Frey & Eichenberger, Anomalies, supra note 64, at 75 ("If politics leads to
unfavourable results, people wrongly believe that this was foreseeable. Therefore they blame
government for having committed a grave mistake.").
84
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 158-60.
85
Bischoff & Siemers, supra note 76, at 175 ("If. . . the positive effects of good policies (or
the negative effects of poor policies) do not become apparent within one term, the incentives to
offer good policies are weak and outcomes are expected to be poor."); SOWELL, supra note 73, at
4 ("[P]olicies that will produce good results before the next election may be preferred even if
they can be expected to produce bad results afterwards.").
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incumbents, then that will weaken the link between an incumbent's
performance and his election prospects.
III. SPECIFIC TYPES OF IRRATIONALITY THAT CAUSE GOVERNMENT FAILURE

Part II described in general terms how irrationality causes government
failure. This Part explains specific types of irrationality and provides examples
of how irrationality has led the government to adopt bad laws.
Although we discuss various failures of rationality, many of them have
two related features in common. First, they involve a failure to rationally assess
the likely consequences, including potential costs and benefits, of government
policies. In some cases, voters and politicians completely ignore costs and
benefits and focus instead on factors that are irrelevant to rational analysis. In
other cases, political actors consider costs and benefits but err systematically in
calculating them.
Second, many of the instances of irrationality that we identify are
examples of a more general phenomenon that psychologists sometimes refer to
as focusing illusion.8 7 People often fail to consider all relevant aspects of a
particular problem. They passively accept the frame or characterization of the
problem that is provided to them. They tend to restrict their thoughts to salient
situational elements, especially information that is explicitly presented." They
often ignore relevant information that remains implicit and therefore "off
screen."
As a result of focusing illusion, voters and politicians do not evaluate
policies globally by considering all angles, including interrelationships among
policies. Instead, their analyses are subject to pervasive framing, salience, and

Bischoff & Siemers, supra note 76, at 175. On the potential causes of incumbent bias, see
Quattrone & Tversky, supra note 24, at 723-26.
87
Rather than using the phrase "focusing illusion," some scholars refer to "focusing effects,"
"focusing failures," "focusing bias," "focusing," "isolation effects," or "isolation errors."
86

Lorraine Chen Idson et al., Overcoming Focusing Failures in Competitive Environments, 17 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 159, 160 (2004); Steven K. Jones et al., Choices and Opportunities:
Another Effect of Framing on Decisions, 11 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 211, 213-14 (1998);

Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts:A Cognitive Perspective
on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 17 (1993); P. Legrenzi et al., Focussing in Reasoning and
Decision Making, 49 COGNITION 36, 58-64 (1993); McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax,
supra note 56, at 107.
88
For reviews of the literature on this point, see Shane Frederick et al., Opportunity Cost
Neglect, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 553, 553-54 (2009); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded
Rationality: Psychologyfor Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REv. 1449, 1458-60 (2003);
Stephen A. Spiller, Opportunity Cost Consideration,38 J. CONSUMER RES. 595, 596 (2011).
Friddric Bastiat recognized the importance of salience in politics over 160 years ago. See
CLAUDE FRtDtRIC BASTIAT, That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen, in 1 THE BASTIAT

COLLECTION 1 (Ludwig von Mises Institute 2d ed. 2007).
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vividness effects." In particular, they frequently fail to see past the superficial
effects of government policy, which is why so many policies are undermined
by unintended consequences. 90 In addition, because vivid stimuli, including
personal experiences and emotionally arousing information, are easier to
encode and retrieve, 91 extreme events and compelling personal accounts of pain
and suffering are often given too much weight in the cost-benefit calculus.92
A.

The Intentions Heuristic:Elevating Intentions Over Consequences

As discussed in Part II, voters are generally altruistic, which raises the
question of how voters determine which policies promote the public interest.
Rationally evaluating policies would require voters to think about their
consequences, including costs and benefits. Unfortunately, cost-benefit analysis
is difficult. 93 So in evaluating policies, voters sometimes invoke simple
heuristics, many of which developed in other contexts and have been
transplanted into politics. Used in the proper context, these heuristics often
facilitate fast and accurate decisions with limited information and processing.
But when applied to policy analysis, they frequently lead to systematic errors,
including ignoring relevant information.94
One such heuristic is the intentions heuristic, which is the tendency to
judge a policy based on the intentions of its advocates rather than on the
policy's actual consequences." The implicit assumption is that good results

E.g., Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 103
(2007) (discussing the influence of framing effects on public opinion); Quattrone & Tversky,
supranote 24, at 727-30.
90
E.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, IsolationEffects and the Neglect ofIndirect
Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 289, 300-01 (2006). Thomas Sowell
refers to this phenomenon as a failure to think beyond stage one. SOWELL, supranote 73, at 6-19.
89

91

RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF

SOCIAL JUDGMENT 45-53 (1980).
92
Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 858.
9
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 58, at 31-38 (discussing the effort required to engage in
conscious reasoning).
Jonathan Baron refers to this problem as involving an overgeneralized heuristic. Jonathan
94
Baron, Why Teach Thinking?-An Essay, 42 APPLIED PSYCHOL.: INT'L REV. 191, 197-99 (1993);
McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supranote 56, at 109.
9
Jeffrey Friedman, Popper, Weber, and Hayek: The Epistemology and Politics of
Ignorance, 17 CRITICAL REV. i, xix-xxi (2005) [hereinafter Friedman, Ignorance]; see also
CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMICS POLICY

RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2 (2007) ("[S]ome commentators and policymakers

are outright dismissive of policy assessments based on cost-benefit analysis, apparently willing to
substitute good intentions-or their own political agenda-for analysis."); Slavisa Tasic, Are
Regulators Rational?, 17 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 1, 8-9 (2011)
[hereinafter Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?].
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follow from good intentions and bad results follow from bad intentions.96 This
assumption is often true, but it is sometimes misleading, especially with respect
to public policy. 97 In particular, voters using the intentions heuristic will favor
policies that make them feel good without first considering costs and benefits.
Once the government adopts feel-good policies, they are often difficult to
repeal because the beneficiaries of these policies are easier to identify than
those who are harmed by them. 99
The intentions heuristic is especially likely to play a role in policy areas
that are emotionally charged. 00 A frequently cited example is the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).) 0' Congress's purpose in adopting the ADA was
to increase employment among people with disabilities by outlawing
discrimination against them. Unfortunately, the Act unintentionally increased
the cost of hiring the disabled by requiring that their employers provide them
with expensive accommodations and by exposing employers to lawsuits when
they fire disabled employees.1 0 2 Consequently, the ADA backfired and actually
decreased employment rates among disabled persons.103
In addition, the intentions heuristic plays a large role in welfare
04
policy.' The public strongly supports welfare programs,10 5 despite evidence
that the programs have perverse consequences and make the poor worse off in

96

Friedman, Ignorance, supra note 95, at xx.

97

Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?,supra note 95, at 8-9.

9
Cf Cowen, supra note 28, at 445 ("[All voters will be excessively attracted to policies that
make citizens 'feel good about themselves.' Individuals on all sides of the political spectrum will
be unwilling to confront difficult trade-offs.").
99
Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, BehavioralEconomics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1,
45 (2003) (arguing that securities regulations that are on net harmful are still difficult to repeal
because a minority of investors reap concentrated and highly visible benefits while the losses
suffered by others are dispersed and obscure); Sam Peltzman, Regulation and the Wealth of
Nations: The Connection Between Government Regulation and Economic Progress, 3 NEW
PERSP. ON POL. ECON. 185, 194 (2007) (making this point with respect to the Americans with
Disabilities Act); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 63, at 604-05 (attributing "regulatory
stickiness" partially to loss aversion, which causes those harmed by regulatory reform to fight
harder against it than those who would benefit are willing to fight for it).
100
Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 95, at 8-9.
101
Slavisa Tasic uses this example to illustrate the intentions heuristic. Id. at 9.
102 Peltzman, supra note 99, at 192-94.
103 Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The
Case of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 109 J. POL. EcON. 915, 948-50 (2001); Thomas
DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 35 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 693, 711 (2000).
104
Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 95, at 8-9.
105

E.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., As SEQUESTER DEADLINE LooMs, LITTLE SUPPORT FOR

CUTTING MOST SPENDING 1 (2013) (finding that only 24% of adults are in favor of decreasing

federal government spending on aid to the needy in the United States).
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the long run.106 From a societal perspective, perhaps the most important of
these consequences is the erosion of the social norm that people should work
and provide for themselves.' 07 Nonetheless, because the stated intent of welfare
programs is to help the poor, opposition to them is often portrayed as
immoral.108

The intentions heuristic also helps explain what economist Bryan
Caplan refers to as antimarket bias. Antimarket bias is "a tendency to
underestimate the economic benefits of the market mechanism." 109 Economists
think of most market exchanges as benefiting both buyer and seller, but many
non-economists view the market as a place in which large corporations exploit
consumers.o Antimarket bias stems at least in part from the intentions
heuristic. Firms are motivated by profit, so consumers conclude that they can
charge exorbitant prices for low quality products." 1 As Joseph Schumpeter
noted, people suffer from an "ineradicable prejudice that every action intended
to serve the profit interest must be anti-social by virtue of this fact alone." 1 2
Antimarket bias likely has other sources as well. It helps people make
sense of a world that seems unjust. According to Caplan, "seeing trade as
disguised exploitation soothes those who dislike the market's outcome." 1 3
More broadly, antimarket bias may be a product of our evolutionary past. 114
Paul Rubin argues that because humans evolved in small hunter-gatherer
societies, our minds do not intuitively understand how modem-day markets
work." 5 Among early humans, the sharing of limited food and other resources

10

E.g., THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A BASIS

FOR SOCIAL POLICY 8-15 (1995).

Schnellenbach & Schubert, Behavioral Public Choice, supra note 9, at 33-34 (discussing
evidence that this norm has eroded and suggesting that one reason is that in recent years,
"politicians have framed the reception of transfers as basic citizen's rights, rather than as a
stigma").
108
See SOWELL, supra note 106, at 14 (noting that one "defense of failed [welfare] policies
has been to claim moral merit for their good intentions").
109
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 30 (emphasis omitted); see also Slavisa Tasic, The
Modern Growth of Government Springs More from Ideas Than from Vested Interests, 14 INDEP.
REv. 549, 554-58 (2010) [hereinafter Tasic, Growth of Government].
110
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 32; Tasic, Growth of Government, supra note 109, at
556-67.
I" Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?,supra note 95, at 8.
107
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JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

234 (Elizabeth Bloody

Schumpeter ed., 1954).
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CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 119.

See Paul H. Rubin, Folk Economics, 70 S. ECoN. J. 157, 160-66 (2003); Tasic, Growth of
Government, supra note 109, at 554-58.
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114

BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC CHOICE

2015]

221

was common, and catching cheaters required close monitoring. 116 The division
of labor and capital accumulation were virtually nonexistent.' Trade was a
zero-sum game.118 People focused primarily on how to divide the existing
economic pie because significantly enlarging it was not an option."'9 As a
result, modem humans find it difficult to view market exchanges as positivesum in nature. Prices appear to be ways of allocating existing wealth rather than
incentivizing new production. In thinking about the economy, most people are
concerned primarily with distributional issues, not economic growth. The idea
is that gains experienced by one person necessarily come at the expense of
others.
Caplan presents survey evidence that the public is substantially more
suspicious of the market than the typical economist.1 20 Controlling for income,
ideology, and several other variables, Caplan shows that relative to economists,
non-economists are much more likely to believe that business tax breaks
significantly harm the economy; that gas prices increase, not because of
changes in supply and demand, but because oil companies are trying to increase
profits; that profits are excessive and executives are overpaid; that gas is
overpriced; and that trade agreements reduce American jobs.1 2 1
Moreover, this antimarket view is not limited to liberal Democrats.
Stephen Miller analyzed survey evidence of attitudes toward the market and
government regulation.1 2 2 He found that "the differences between conservatives
and liberals are often fairly small, and. . . most conservatives, too, are wary of
free markets, bordering on being hostile to them--especially when it comes to
particulars, rather than abstractions."1 2 3 In particular, 69% of conservatives
believe that shareholders receive an excessive share of profits relative to
workers; 65% favor government price controls; 63% support governmentprovided jobs and aid to growing industries; 45% support government aid of
declining industries; 44% believe that business is too powerful; and 39% view
management and workers as fundamentally at odds with one another. 124
From the perspective of economists, the public's thinking about the
market is misguided because it ignores the role of competition. 125 Competition

116
117

11

Id. at 160-64.
Id.
Id.

"' Id. at 164.
120

CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note
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Id.
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Stephen Miller, Conservatives and Liberals on Economics: Expected Diferences,

15, at 50-93.

Surprising Similarities, 19 CRITICAL REv. 47 (2007).
123
Id. at 53.
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Id at 53-54.
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CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 30.
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limits prices and generally ensures that in the long run, the most profitable
firms are those that provide valuable products at a relatively low cost. As a
result, economists have long recognized that individuals pursuing their own
self-interest can enhance social welfare.1 2 6 The public apparently disagrees.
In addition to the intentions heuristic, overconfidence in government is
another source of antimarket bias. The Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive
bias that leads people with a superficial understanding of a subject to
overestimate their competence and underestimate what they do not know.1 2 7
This can cause voters and politicians who lack a detailed understanding of the
economy to conclude wrongly that the government can easily fix problems that
they perceive with the market.1 28
David Hirshleifer argues that overconfidence causes voters and
politicians to "too readily assume that a perceived social problem has not been
addressed by the market, and [to be] too sure of proposed remedies."1 2 9 As an
example, consider proposals for transaction taxes to limit speculation in asset
markets. Hirshleifer describes numerous ways in which the market addresses
speculation and excessive trading, but which are rarely discussed by proponents
of transaction taxes.1 3 0
Caplan argues that antimarket bias leads to two fallacies in particular
that have an important influence on the law. First, people often ignore the
incentive effects of market payments and think of them instead as mere
transfers.' 3 ' This causes profits to appear as a gift to the rich rather than a
reward for cutting costs, improving resource allocation, and inventing products
that people want to buy. In particular, people view interest payments with
intense suspicion because they see that the payments involve a transfer from the
debtor, who is often poor, to the lender, who is often rich. What they fail to
notice is that the prospect of earning interest incentivizes people to save money
and to make loans, including loans to the poor, which alleviate poverty. The
tendency to ignore the incentive effects of market payments contributes to the
prevalence of windfall profits taxes, usury laws, and laws against price
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Id. at 864-65.
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(Wallace Brockway ed., 1952) (1776) ("It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own
necessities but of their advantages.").
127
Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in
Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121 (1999).
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Cf Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 95, at 9-13 (arguing that regulators are
overconfident in their ability to manage the economy).
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Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 864.
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gouging, the latter of which sometimes create shortages of essential goods
following disasters. 13 2
Second, people believe that the market is dominated by monopolists
and that firms can take advantage of their customers and workers by raising
prices and suppressing wages whenever business executives are feeling
especially greedy.133 In fact, in the United States, most markets, including labor
markets, are highly competitive.1 3 4 The false belief that they are not helps
explain antitrust laws, price controls, and other consumer protection laws,
many of which do more harm than good.1 3 5
B. The Availability Heuristic:MiscalculatingRisk
In addition to the intentions heuristic, voters and politicians also invoke
the availability heuristic, which is the tendency to estimate the importance and
frequency of an event based upon how easy it is to recall examples of it.' 36 The
availability heuristic exaggerates the importance of risks that are vivid and
salient. Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein argue that this heuristic can cause
availability cascades, which are "self-reinforcing process[es] of collective
belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that
gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in
public discourse."

37

In an availability cascade, people with imperfect information accept
something as true because others believe it. Moreover, people feel social
pressure to accept a particular belief and become reluctant to publicly express
their skepticism.1 3 8 Special interest groups and other availability entre reneurs
attempt to create availability cascades to advance their agendas. 9 In an
availability cascade, media and public opinion may swing to a particular
position, which then leads to an increasingly one-sided presentation of evidence
favoring that position.1 40 Because people do not adequately discount one-sided

Id.; Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 870.
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 34-35.
134
Id. at 34-36; WINSTON, supra note 95, at 15 (summarizing evidence that the U.S. economy
does not suffer "from any serious underlying anticompetitive problems").
135
On the harm caused by certain regulations, see WINSTON, supra note 95.
136
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 54, at 1127.
137
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 683.
138
Id. at 720-28.
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Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 866.
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evidence,141 pressure for the government to respond to the perceived threat can
become enormous. 142
Kuran and Sunstein present evidence that availability cascades can
transform minor risks into mass scares. Among the examples they provide are
public panics related to Alar, a pesticide used on apples, and the Love Canal
chemical waste site. 143 Kuran and Sunstein suggest that science did not support
that these panics were justified by real risks; rather, they resulted largely from
the efforts of availability entrepreneurs. 1
W. Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer have identified a common instance in
which risks become particularly salient and available. 14 5 They argue that newly
discovered risks or an increase in the level of a familiar risk "tend to generate
extreme responses" and "create pressure for alarmist government
regulations." 4 6 As evidence for this claim, they discuss the arguably excessive
reactions on the part of various governments to the mad cow disease outbreak
in the United Kingdom as well as alarmist responses to the recent Ebola threat
in the United States. 14 7
The adverse effects of the availability heuristic are exacerbated by a
related phenomenon that George Loewenstein and his colleagues refer to as
"risk as feelings."l 4 8 In coping with risks, rational actors would process risks
cognitively, focusing on the consequences of their decisions.1 4 9 They would
compute the expected utility of each option taking into account the likelihood
of particular outcomes, including unwanted contingencies. But Loewenstein
argues that, in some instances, emotions influence decisions more than
cognitive assessments of risk.150 Moreover, the factors that trigger a strong
emotional response to a particular risk often have little to do with cognitive
processing. 151 Cognitive assessments of risk depend on expected utility whereas
emotional responses are heavily influenced by mental images of possible
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Lyle A. Brenner et al., On the Evaluation of One-Sided Evidence, 9 J. BEHAV. DECISION
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Id. at 994.
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For a discussion of the standard economic model of risky choices, see DAVID BESANKO
144

&

145

RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICs 627-33 (4th ed. 2011); see also Loewenstein et al.,

supranote 148, at 267.
150
Loewenstein et al., supra note 148, at 274.
151
Id. at 271.

BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC CHOICE

2015]

225

outcomes. 15 2 Thus, the notion of risk as feelings helps explain regulatory

overreaction to otherwise minor risks that are particularly vivid and prominent
in public discourse.
Although not directly related to risk regulation, the distribution of U.S.
disaster relief funds also demonstrates the importance of salience and vividness
effects on public policy. Thomas Eisensee and David Stromberg find that the
allocation of these funds to victims of natural disasters in foreign countries
depends significantly on news coverage of the disaster. 153 As a result, disasters
that occur at the same time as other newsworthy events such as the Olympics
are less likely to prompt relief efforts. 154 Additionally, disasters such as
volcanoes that are accompanied by spectacular events that make them more
newsworthy are more likely to prompt relief efforts than disasters that are less
spectacular and therefore less newsworthy such as famines. 155
C. Ideological Bias: Clinging to CertainBeliefs

Most people are not neutral analysts who rationally evaluate the costs
and benefits of government policies in an open-minded way. Instead, they are
attached to certain preconceived ideas which constitute their worldview or
more narrowly their political ideology. Ideology distorts their view of reality
and shapes their policy preferences, a phenomenon that we refer to as
ideological bias. Ideological bias sometimes manifests itself as a mild form of
confirmation bias, which involves "the seeking or interpreting of evidence in
ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in

152

Id.; cf

154

id

supra note 64, at 139-40 (reviewing evidence that the general public fears
nuclear power more than experts because lay people assess risks by focusing on "catastrophic
potential" and "threat to future generations," whereas experts focus on annual fatalities); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 45 (2002) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON] (discussing how emotions influence reactions to risks and
concluding that "people's reactions to risks are often based mostly on the badness of the outcome
and the vividness of that outcome rather than on the probability of its occurrence").
153
Thomas Eisensee & David Strdmberg, News Droughts, News Floods, and US. Disaster
Relief 122 Q.J. EcON. 693, 721-22 (2007).
PLOUS,

Id. at 722-23. What makes an event newsworthy? Evidence suggests a bad-news bias.
Media coverage is skewed in favor of reporting negative events such as crimes, which we find
more interesting because of our naturally evolved tendency to pay more attention to threats and
negative information than to positive information. GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra
note 66, at 114-19.
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hand."156 At other times, ideological bias involves a passionate commitment to
particular ideas, which may rival religious devotion.
What causes ideological bias? One possibility is that some of the
beliefs that people hold result from motives other than a love for the truth.' 58
People may have preferences over beliefs meaning that they enjoy holding
those beliefs." 9 In some cases, holding certain beliefs furthers our material selfinterest or enhances our reputation and social standing. In other cases, specific
beliefs improve our self-image or confer other important psychological
benefits, including feelings of comfort, flattery, and excitement, so we resist
changing them.
If people cherish certain beliefs, then they may also engage in
motivated reasoning.1 60 People often search for and interpret information in a
way that confirms their prior views, they ignore disconfirming information, and
they rationalize conclusions that they in fact reached for other reasons.1 6 1
Motivated reasoning is constrained by the ability to think of apparently
reasonable justifications for particular views.1 62 In other words, people can be
persuaded by strong counterevidence to change their minds, but once a view
becomes firmly rooted, persuasion is difficult, especially if the person in
question is knowledgeable about the issue, has publicly committed to a
particular position, and has defended it from prior attacks.1 63
For a detailed review of the literature on confirmation bias, see Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A UbiquitousPhenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175
(1998).
157
See CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 14-16.
158
For a review of the evidence regarding various sources of beliefs, see id. at 14-16, 115-19.
156
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Id. at 14-18, 114-41; George A. Akerlof, The Economics of Illusion, 1 ECON. & POL. 1
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The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. EcON. REV. 307, 307 (1982)
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EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 39-45 (Indep. Inst. 2013) (arguing that
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For a discussion of motivated reasoning in the context of political beliefs, see generally
Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation ofPoliticalBeliefs, 50
AM. J. POL. SCI. 755 (2006).
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Id. at 760-67. See generally GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 66, at 299300; Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990)
(providing a detailed discussion of motivated reasoning); Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of
Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emotional Constraintson PartisanPoliticalJudgment
in the 2004 U.S. PresidentialElection, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1947 (2006) (providing
neuroscientific evidence of motivated reasoning).
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Kunda, supra note 161, at 480.
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GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 66, at 299-303; Taber & Lodge, supra
note 160, at 757.
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If ideological bias is a form of motivated reasoning, then its prevalence
in politics can be explained by the low personal stakes in voting.' In some
contexts, rigid adherence to erroneous beliefs comes at a high price. If you
believe that the world will end tomorrow, you will find yourself in trouble if
you quit your job today and your prediction then proves false. People have an
incentive to avoid mistaken beliefs that impose substantial personal costs. But
in politics, false beliefs generally do not entail negative consequences for those
who hold them. In particular, because a single vote rarely affects election
outcomes, voters who hold false beliefs about political matters suffer no
personal harm as a result. Moreover, most or all of the damage falls on others
who are adversely affected by the bad laws that these beliefs engender.
An alternative explanation of ideological bias is that it results from
path dependent filtering of information over time.165 According to this view, an
ideology is a schematic template that allows a person to make sense of the
complex environment in which he finds himself The particular ideology that a
given person embraces may result from random events, such as having read
Karl Marx at a young age as opposed to Ayn Rand. But once it takes root, the
ideology constitutes the interpretive framework through which people process
(filter and organize) new information. An ideology facilitates comprehension of
otherwise confusing events by allowing a person to focus on "the relatively
small class of information that fits the schemas."l 6 6 People notice information
congruent with their ideology, but dismiss incongruent information as
unimportant or incomprehensible. Over time, this process becomes selfreinforcing as a growing database of congruent information confirms that the
person's ideology is correct, possibly leading to a spiral of conviction.' 67 This
may explain why those who are most informed about politics tend to be the
most biased in evaluating political information.1 68 Becoming informed often
means becoming close-minded. Viewed in this way, ideological bias is a sort of
inadvertent dogmatism that is inevitable even for those motivated to hold
accurate beliefs.169
164
165

See CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 114-40.
See Jeffrey Friedman, Motivated Skepticism or Inevitable Conviction? Dogmatism and the

Study of Politics, 24 CRITICAL REV. 131, 134 (2012) [hereinafter Friedman, Dogmatism]; cf
Baron, supra note 94, at 195-97 (discussing "myside bias," which is a bias toward possible
answers that initially seem correct; which results in biased search for, recall of, and interpretation
of new information; and which explains both motivated and unmotivated errors).
166
Friedman, Dogmatism, supra note 165, at 133.
117
Id. at 134.
168
For a discussion of bias among informed voters, see Taber & Lodge, supra note 160, at
760-67.
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Whatever its causes, ideological bias affects policy preferences as well
as how people interpret new information. In one study, researchers sorted
subjects into two groups based upon whether they favored capital punishment
or not.170 The researchers then described to the subjects two studies that
reached opposing conclusions about whether capital punishment deters
crime. 1 The subjects tended to criticize the study that disconfirmed their prior
position while showing less skepticism toward the other study.1 72 Surprisingly,
the subjects became more polarized in their views of capital punishment after
participating in the experiment. 17 3
Ideological bias also influences the sources of political information that
people turn to. People (especially those who are well-educated or who are
knowledgeable about and interested in politics) tend to discuss politics only
with those who agree with them.174 This phenomenon has consequences
because reasoning improves when a person knows that he will have to present
his case to a well-informed audience who might not share his views. The
tendency to talk only to those who agree leads to intellectual laziness and
irrational thinking. 75

In addition, ideological bias impacts media coverage of politics. People
prefer media sources that are biased in favor of their ideology.1 76 Apparently,
people wish to be entertained, to have their existing beliefs confirmed, and to
take part in bashing the opposition. As a result, little demand exists for neutral
media sources that objectively evaluate policy proposals. 17 7 As with politicians,

&

conclusions reached based upon these simple models. Even when the evidence suggests that a
person's economic model is wrong, he will not be quick to change it because he has little
incentive to ensure the model is a good one. In addition, elements of the economic model (e.g.,
the beliefs and assumptions on which it is based) may be relevant to models of other fields in life
so that changing the economic model would require updating these other models, many of which
may have greater personal significance for the person than the economic model. Bischoff
Siemers, supra note 76, at 175.
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journalists probably have some slack to challenge their audience's
preconceived ideas. But this slack is limited and may be diminishing over time
as a more competitive marketplace produces news outlets that carefully cater to
consumers' preferences, including their ideological preferences. 7 8 Moreover,
journalists may abuse any slack that they possess, e.g., by promoting their own
biased views.' 7 9

As a result of ideological bias, the legislative process will often
produce laws that result more from the prevailing ideology than from careful
analysis of costs and benefits. 80 Robert Higgs describes an important example
of this phenomenon.' 8 ' Higgs notes that the major crises in American history,
including the two world wars and the Great Depression, coincided with rapid
government growth.1 82 After these crises ended, government shrank but the
retrenchment was incomplete. Higgs argues that each crisis broke down
ideological resistance to bigger government and increased willingness to
tolerate programs and a level of government power that would have been
unthinkable before the crisis.' 83 In the 1890s, the dominant ideology in the
United States held that government had a very limited mission. But by the end
of the 20th century, that view had changed dramatically. In particular, Higgs
provides evidence that crises and the ideological changes that they brought
about substantially and permanently increased the scope and importance of the
military-industrial complex, labor laws, the welfare state, the federal income
tax, agricultural policy, and numerous other government activities and
programs.184

178
Daniel Sutter, Can the Media Be So Liberal? The Economics of Media Bias, 20 CATO J.
431, 448-49 (2001).
179
See Valentino Larcinese, Riccardo Puglisi & James M. Snyder Jr., Partisan Bias in
Economic News: Evidence on the Agenda-Setting Behaviorof U.S. Newspapers, 95 J. PUB. ECON.
1178, 1188 (2011) (finding "strong evidence that newspapers endorsing Democratic candidates
give less coverage to high unemployment (and more coverage to low unemployment) under
Clinton than under George W. Bush, as compared to Republican-leaning newspapers"); Sutter,
supra note 178, at 441-45 (presenting evidence of liberal bias among journalists and describing
how it may affect news coverage).
180
See, e.g., HIGGS, supra note 159, at 43-44 (arguing that debates over the essential character
of the economic order and distributional conflicts within the existing economic order "involve
not simply questions of what is technically better or worse; rather, they are seen to involve good
and evil").
''
See generally id. at 123-257.
182

id

Id at 67-72; cf Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 30-33 (arguing that bureaucrats at the
Securities and Exchange Commission are biased in favor of interpreting new evidence as
justifying the agency's prior regulatory actions); Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 46-47
(arguing that once adopted, policies are hard to change due to status quo bias).
184
See generally HIGGS, supra note 159, at 123-236. In addition, Higgs describes in detail
how the world wars and the Great Depression produced changes in constitutional law that
181
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Given that ideologies are so important, the question arises which types
of ideas are likely to crystallize into an influential ideology. David Hirshleifer
argues that "ideologies are assemblies of more basic memes-very simple
propositions or ideas that affect our thoughts and actions."185 In addition,
"[i]deologies, exist because they are good at catching our cognitive and
emotional hooks, which enables them to spread from person to person." 86
To illustrate how ideologies form and spread, Hirshleifer describes the
financial ideology of anti-short-termism, which is the belief that public
companies in the United States are too focused on the short run.187 Hirshleifer
argues that anti-short-termism stems from five simple propositions: "that firms
are focused on short-term stock prices, that firms underinvest, that firms don't
innovate enough, that firms are overleveraged, and that the stock market is
fixated upon short-term information signals (an informational inefficiency)."
Hirshleifer presents evidence that these propositions are incorrect. Yet antishort-termism has been popular for decades and persists to this day.
Hirshleifer argues that anti-short-termism is impervious to the evidence
against it because its basic memes manipulate our psychological biases. They
exploit the high esteem in which we hold self-discipline and foresight, and they
recruit "our preexisting mental equipment for thinking about morality and sin,
folly and wisdom, ant and grasshopper."' 89 This is why public discussions of
short-termism are often framed in moral language. Moreover, at the individual
firm level, it is easy to attribute virtually any bad outcome to short-termism
despite the general lack of evidence in support of its fundamental tenets. 190
As this example illustrates, ideologies can be problematic because they
often have little connection with reality. Their premises may not be supported
by evidence, and the policies that they lead their adherents to support can have
adverse (sometimes disastrous) consequences. Yet people (consciously or
unconsciously) cling to their respective ideologies, which are very difficult to
dislodge.

dramatically and permanently increased the government's power to interfere with private
property rights and freedom of contract.
185
Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 867.
186
Id.; cf Tasic, Growth of Government, supra note 109, at 554 ("[M]any common
misconceptions and fallacies are intuitively appealing to and immediately accepted by most
people and, as a result, are very easily spread.").
187
Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 867-68.
18

Id. at 868.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 869.
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D. Action Bias: IrrationallyDemandingAction
Rather than focusing on the expected costs and benefits of their
behavior, people sometimes succumb to an irrational penchant for action-a
phenomenon known as action bias.' 91 In some instances, taking action simply
seems normal. In particular, people often feel compelled to take action
following a bad outcome. 192 Problems demand solutions. As a result, if a sports
team loses two consecutive games, people predict that the team's coach will
feel more responsible for the second loss if he failed to make changes as a
result of the first.' 9 3 This bias in favor of action can impair judgment because
inaction is sometimes the best response to a perceived problem.
Action bias also manifests itself in situations in which taking action
facilitates claiming credit for a good outcome. In one experiment, Anthony Patt
and Richard Zeckhauser gave subjects the option of using limited funds to
either clean up a polluted resource (water or air) or to preserve a resource that
was currently unpolluted but that was threatened by pollution.1 94 The results
indicated that people generally favor cleaning up a polluted resource over
preserving an unpolluted resource. 9 5 Patt and Zeckhauser concluded that
cleaning up a polluted resource has an obvious impact that is easy to visualize,
whereas preserving an unpolluted resource avoids a nondemonstrable loss.' 96
People are biased in favor of taking action when doing so allows them to claim
credit for demonstrable gains.
Action bias sometimes leads to unwarranted government intervention.
If a problem arises, the public demands that government respond without much
concern over whether action is better than inaction.1 98 By the same token,

Michael Bar-Eli et al., Action Bias Among Elite Soccer Goalkeepers: The Case of Penalty
191
Kicks, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 606, 608 n.2 (2007); see also Anthony Patt & Richard Zeclchauser,
Action Bias and Environmental Decisions, 21 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 45, 45-47 (2000); Marcel
Zeelenberg et al., The Inaction Effect in the Psychology of Regret, 82 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 314, 317-24 (2002). For further discussion of action bias and government failure, see
Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?,supra note 95, 3-4.
192
Zeelenberg et al., supra note 191, at 317.
193
194
195

Id. at 317-23.
See Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 191, at 55-59.
Id. at 58.

Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 50-52.
198
Cf Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 864 ("The public wants government to do something
about problems, which implicitly assumes that a useful intervention exists."); Roberta Romano,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack CorporateGovernance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521,
1591-94 (2005) (describing how various economic crises have led to the adoption of financial
regulation that is arguably ineffective and excessively costly). On the other hand, status quo bias
creates reluctance to modify existing polices. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 46-47. In
other words, crises motivate the adoption of policies that, once adopted, become difficult to
196
197
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politicians are often quick to supply legislation, which allows them to take
credit for addressing the problem that has captured the public's attention.
A prominent example of a law that resulted from action bias is the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Roberta Romano describes in detail how SOX was
hastily adopted in response to the scandals related to Enron and WorldCom,
two companies that collapsed amidst allegations of accounting fraud and
insider self-dealing.' 99 Romano argues that Congress was overly eager to pass
legislation in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals.2 0 0 As a result,
SOX "was not the focus of careful deliberation by Congress . . [and] was
emergency legislation enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate,
during a media frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and
insolvency cases." 20 1 Moreover, Congress ignored evidence that SOX's
corporate governance provisions simply would not work.202 As a result,
Congress adopted a law that is arguably ineffective and excessively costly. In
particular, it diverts the attention of corporate managers and directors from
providing business guidance to overseeing legal compliance,203 and it may also
contribute to a reduction in cross listings by foreign firms on U.S. stock
exchanges.204
E.

Extremeness Aversion: Gravitating Toward "Moderate" Policies

The rational actor model assumes that choices are not affected by
irrelevant options. Imagine a choice between options A and B. If a rational
decision maker would choose A when a third option, C, is not available, then
she would not choose B simply because C becomes available. In reality, by
changing the decision frame, irrelevant options sometimes alter decisions.
One instance of this phenomenon is extremeness aversion: "The
attractiveness of an option is enhanced if it is an intermediate option in the

dislodge absent another crisis. Stephen Choi and Adam Pritchard provide evidence of this
phenomenon in regulatory action (and inaction) by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 27 (describing this regulatory approach as "put out fires and
'don't fix what ain't broken').
Romano, supra note 198, at 1523.
199
200
Id. at 1525-26 ("The suggestion from the media was that the priority of members of
Congress was to enact something, with the specific content of less concern and importance.").
201
Id. at 1528.
202
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 1587-91 (discussing the costs imposed on firms as a result of SarbanesOxley); Tom Perkins, The "Compliance" Board, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2007),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB 17280725006124469.
204
Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-OxleyAct
and the Flow of International Listings, 46 J. ACCT. REs. 383, 387-88 (2008) (finding that
Sarbanes-Oxley led to fewer cross listings by small foreign firms).
203
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choice set and is diminished if it is an extreme option." 2 05 For example, in one
study, participants choosing between a cheap, low-quality camera and a higherpriced, medium-quality camera were equally split. But when researchers added
an even more expensive, high-quality camera to the choice set, participants
became substantially more likely to choose the medium-quality camera. 2 06
In politics, extremeness aversion is yet another reason that voters and
politicians fail to focus on the consequences of policies. Regardless of their
likely consequences, moderate policies are attractive simply because voters and
politicians perceive them as lying between two extremes.
Mario Rizzo and Douglas Whitman argue that extremeness aversion
facilitates the slide down the slippery slope toward more intrusive
government.2 07 Political activists favoring regulation initially propose a policy
that represents a minor intrusion with relatively low costs imposed on the
regulated party. They frame the proposal as a middle ground between extreme
laissez-faire and more burdensome interventions. But once adopted, the
moderate policy now becomes the new laissez-faire position and the middle
ground shifts in the direction of greater intervention creating a dynamic that
leads to additional regulation.
To illustrate this dynamic, Rizzo and Whitman describe the gradual
progression of smoking restrictions related to air travel. 208 In 1973, the Civil
Aeronautics Board mandated separate sections on airplanes for smokers and
nonsmokers. This step was a compromise between the extreme positions of
laissez-faire and a smoking ban, which would have imposed significant costs
on smokers. In subsequent debates, the separation of smokers from nonsmokers
became the new laissez-faire position, and the middle ground shifted in the
direction of a total ban. In 1988, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
increased the costs imposed on smokers by banning smoking on all scheduled
domestic flights shorter than two hours. In 1990, the FAA banned smoking on
all scheduled domestic flights no matter their duration, and in 2000, the
Department of Transportation extended the ban to all U.S. international flights.
Rizzo and Whitman argue that incremental shifts in the middle ground led to a
policy that once would have been politically unacceptable.

205

Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: TradeoffContrastandExtremeness
Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 281 (1992).
206
Id. at 290.
207

Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New

Paternalismon the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIz. L. REv. 685, 729-32 (2009).
208 Id. at 731-32.
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F. In-Group Bias: Us Versus Them
In-group bias (sometimes called ethnocentrism) "is a predisposition to
divide the human world into in-groups and out-groups... a readiness to reduce
society to us and them." 2 09 Stated succinctly,
Members of in-groups (until they prove otherwise) are
assumed to be virtuous: friendly, cooperative, trustworthy,
safe, and more. Members of out-groups (until they prove
otherwise) are assumed to be the opposite.... Symbols and
practices become objects of attachment and pride when they
belong to the in-group and objects of condescension, disdain,
and (in extreme cases) hatred when they belong to out21
gUS210
groups.

In-group bias has multiple sources. First, it has a strong genetic
component, which is likely the result of human evolution and the fact that early
humans sought security and survival through group living.2 1' Second,
stereotyping of out-groups may result from cognitive processes that are often
automatic and that stem from the need to rely upon simplified categories (such
as us versus them) to conserve mental resources while processing otherwise
complex stimuli. 2 12 Third, people are motivated to engage in in-group bias
when groups are competing for scarce resources. 213 Fourth, because group
membership influences our sense of identity, we can increase our self-esteem
by boosting the status of the groups to which we belong and denigrating the
members of out- oups. 2 14 Similarly, in-group bias is related to self-serving
attribution bias.21 People tend to think that they are right and others are wrong.
By extension, people also tend to think that their in-group is right and that outgroups are wrong.2 16 Fifth, people who are frustrated by some setback may
displace the accompanying aggression that they experience onto relatively
powerless out-groups because those groups make safe targets.2 17 Finally, in209

DONALD R. KINDER & CINDY D. KAM,

Us AGAINST THEM: ETHNOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN OPINION 8 (2010). For a neuroscientific analysis of in-group bias, see generally Pascal
Molenbergs, The Neuroscience of In-Group Bias, 37 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS.
1530 (2013).
210
211

& KAM, supra note 209, at 8.
Id. at 22-29, 32-35.
KINDER

212

GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 66, at 428-43.

213

Id. at 415-20.

214

Id. at 422-25.
Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 861.
Id.; AARON T. BECK, PRISONERS OF HATE: THE COGNITIVE BASIS

215

216

OF ANGER, HOSTILITY, AND

BIAS 141-54 (1999).
217

GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 66, at 426-27.
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group bias may be partially an outgrowth of the authoritarian personality.
Authoritarians favor group authority and uniformity over individual autonomy
and diversity, and they are also somewhat more likely to exhibit in-group
bias.218
Whatever its sources, in-group bias is empirically important in politics.
For example, Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam present evidence that even after
controlling for various other explanatory variables, people who tend to view
their race as superior to other races are more likely to support the war on
terrorism. 219 In-group bias also causes people to interpret information in a way
that serves their in-group. And in combination with the desire to blame others
for bad outcomes, in-group bias leads to scapegoating of out-groups. 2 20
Scholarship in behavioral public choice has devoted particular attention
to two forms of in-group bias-partisan bias and xenophobia. We discuss each
of these in turn.
1. Partisan Bias
Ilya Somin argues that among the group of well-informed voters, many
are "political fans," whom he analogizes to sports fans. 221 Political fans acquire
political information not because they want to contribute to the public good of a
well-informed citizenry or because they expect to influence the outcome of
elections. Instead, they view political information as a consumption good. They
"derive enjoyment from rooting for their preferred parties, candidates,
ideologies, and interest groups, while deriding the opposition." 222 In addition,
"[t]hey may also derive satisfaction from having their preexisting views
validated, and from a sense of affiliation with a group of like-minded
people." 22 3 We refer to the phenomenon of political fandom as partisan bias,
and it helps explain why the most important determinant of political knowledge
is not education, but the person's level of interest in politics.

24

In Section C of this Part, we discussed how people cling to their
ideology. Ideological bias is an aspect of partisan bias, but partisan bias is a

218

KINDER & KAM, supra note 209, at 64-65.
Id. at 73-104, 182-99; see also Wallerstein, supra note 44, at 43-44 (discussing evidence
that voters "attach greater weight to the welfare of their own racial group than to members of
other racial groups").
220
Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 861.
221
SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 78.
222
id
219

Id at 78-79; see also Cowen, supra note 28, at 437-40. This point is consistent with what
social psychologists refer to as the value-expressive function of attitudes. We belong to certain
reference groups whose opinions matter to us and which we join in part to express our attitudes
and values. GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 66, at 277.
224
SOMrN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 82-83.
223
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broader phenomenon. Partisans are attached not only to certain ideas, but also
to a particular political party and to certain politicians and special interest
groups. As a result, partisan bias is a type of in-group bias.
Partisan bias influences how people interpret new information and even
what facts they remember.225 Somin cites evidence that "Republican partisans
tend to assign credit to Republican office-holders for any positive events that
occur, while being reluctant to blame them for negative ones. Democratic
partisans, of course, have the opposite bias."226 Voters also claim that
unemployment and inflation rates are higher when the sitting president is from
the party opposite their own.227 And voters are more likely to remember facts
that reflect poorly on a president from the opposite party.228
Partisan bias further undermines the argument discussed in Part II that
democracy works better when voters focus on outcomes rather than policies.
Partisan bias prevents voters from accurately assessing the performance of
incumbent politicians. Moreover, independents are not in a good position to
offset the effects of partisan voters because independents tend to have the
lowest levels of political knowledge.229
Partisan bias, combined with political ignorance, also makes the public
susceptible to misinformation and, in particular, contributes to a proliferation of
conspiracy theories. 23 0 For example, many Republicans believe that President
Obama was not born in the United States and is therefore ineligible to be
president. 2 3 1 And many Democrats believe that President Bush knew in
advance about the 9/11 terrorist attacks.232
In addition, partisan bias helps in understanding the behavior of
lobbyists. In some cases, lobbyists may attempt to persuade those who disagree
with them. But the primary function of lobbying may be to cement and
maintain ties among people who already agree with one another.23 3 In other

More generally, psychologists have shown that our existing attitudes influence what we
pay attention to and remember. GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 66, at 279-80.
226
Id. at 104-05 (citations omitted).
225

227
228

Id. at 105.

Id. at 96.
Id. at 105, 112.
230
Id. at 84-88; cf HIGGS, supra note 159, at 48-49 (discussing the influence of opinion
leaders on public opinion and of the emotional character of ideological rhetoric).
231
Humphrey Taylor, "Wingnuts" and President Obama, THEHARRISPOLL (Mar.
23, 2010),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris InteractivePollPolitics-Wingnuts_2010_03.pdf.
232 22% Believe Bush Knew About 9/11 Attacks in Advance, RASMUSSENREPORTS
(May 4,
2007), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/current events/bushadministr
ation/22_believe bush-knew-about_9_11 attacks in advance.
233
Schnellenbach & Schubert, Behavioral Public Choice, supra note 9, at 13; Frans van
Winden, On the Economic Theory of Interest Groups: Towards a Group Frame of Reference in
PoliticalEconomics, 100 PUB. CHOICE 1, 20-21 (1999).
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words, lobbyists seek to reinforce
with the surprising finding that
campaign contributions for their
resources to legislators who are
position. 234

237

and exploit in-group bias. This is consistent
legislators generally do not receive large
votes and that lobbyists devote substantial
already favorable to their preferred policy

2. Xenophobia
Xenophobia, or fear of and hostility toward foreigners, is an intense
form of in-group bias. Xenophobia manifests itself in many ways, including
economic policy. As discussed in the Introduction, Bryan Caplan provides
evidence that voters suffer from "antiforeign bias, a tendency to underestimate
the economic benefits of interaction with foreigners."235 Antiforeign bias causes
voters to support harmful protectionist policies. 236 And the temptation to
scapegoat foreign competitors for domestic economic ills becomes especially
powerful during recessions when unemployment is high.237
In addition, exploiting xenophobia is a popular technique for marketing
special interest legislation to the public. Consider farm subsidies. As discussed
in more detail below, these subsidies persist despite staunch opposition by
economists, who argue that they inefficiently transfer money from consumers
and taxpayers to large corporations and farmers, many of whom are wealthy.
One reason why farm subsidies are so popular is that politicians present them in
a way that exploits xenophobia. A popular argument is to suggest that farm
subsidies are important to national defense because they reduce reliance on
food imports and ensure "a safe and reliable food supply that is home
grown." 238

G. Ignoring Hidden Taxes

Advocates of limited government have long argued that the
government's use of hidden or low-salience taxes causes voters to
234
For evidence supporting these findings, see Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff,
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 69, 69-71 (2006).
235
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 36; Caplan, Rational Irrationality,supra note 15, at 1516.
236
In a survey of members of the American Economic Association, 87.5% agreed that the
United States should eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers. Whaples, supra note 78, at 1. On
the other hand, the public generally opposes free trade. See CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 51.

237

CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 37. In addition, the degree of antiforeign bias varies by

country depending on physical, linguistic, and cultural similarity. Americans worry more about
economic competition from Japan and Mexico than from Canada and England. Id. at 39.
238 Mary Clare Jalonick, Inside Washington: Farm Subsidies' Staying Power, BOSTON.COM
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/11/14/ insidewashington farm
subsidies stayingpower/ (quoting Representative Vicky Hartzler of Missouri).
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systematically underestimate the cost of government programs. 239 The idea is
that politicians use deceptive techniques such as complex tax structures, deficit
spending, and indirect taxes to conceal costs and expand government to a size
that informed voters would not condone.24 0
Despite its intuitive appeal, the notion that hidden taxes are dangerous
and deceptive becomes difficult to sustain if we assume that voters are rational.
Rational voters would not systematically underestimate their taxes even if the
amount paid was less than obvious. Some might overestimate and some might
underestimate, but in the aggregate, rational voters would accurately perceive
government's true cost.
That conclusion changes, however, once we acknowledge irrationality.
Scholars have only recently begun to identify the psychological mechanisms
underlying tax salience effects. 2 4 1 But the simplest explanation is that, as with
other information, voters tend to ignore taxes that are implicit or otherwise less
than obvious. They do not consider who actually pays hidden taxes. 24 2 In other
words, when taxes are hidden using the techniques described above, more
voters underestimate these taxes than overestimate them. In the aggregate,
errors by individual voters do not cancel, and hidden taxes cause voters to
conclude that government costs less than it in fact does.
Unlike most topics in behavioral public choice, hidden taxes have
attracted significant attention from legal scholars and mainstream economists.
As a result, the tax salience literature is large and growing, and we will not
review it in detail. We simply note that the empirical evidence suggests that tax
salience effects are real, but the size and policy significance of these effects
remains uncertain.

239

For reviews of the literature on tax salience and the related concept of fiscal illusion, see

MUELLER, supra note 23, at 527-29; Brian E. Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical

Analysis of FiscalIllusion, 10 J. ECON. SURVS. 261, 290-93 (1996); Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009); David Gamage, On the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship:
Operative Mechanisms and Limiting Factors, 41 FLA. ST. L. REV. 173, 176-79 (2013); David
Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political

Salience, 65 TAX L. REv. 19, 33-54 (2011).
240
As discussed in Section I of this Part, deficit spending may not be forced upon the public
by deceitful politicians eager to expand government. Rather, it may be a byproduct of the
public's strong demand for government programs that the public is not willing to pay for in
higher taxes.
241
Gamage & Shanske, supra note 239, at 179-93; McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax,
supranote 56, at 119-20.
242
McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra note 56, at 127.
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H. Ignoring Hidden Regulatory Costs

The costs of regulation may be even less salient than hidden taxes.
Richard Posner made a similar observation over 40 years ago. 243 Posner pointed
out that regulation often substitutes for taxation. When the government
mandates that a regulated firm provide a service to someone at less than its
cost, the firm generally passes on the resulting loss to its customers by charging
higher prices for the products they purchase. 2 " This creates "internal
subsidization," which can "be viewed as an exertion of state power whose
purpose, like that of other taxes, is to compel members of the public to support
a service that the market would provide at a reduced level, or not at all." 2 4 5
Posner recognized that "[a] troubling characteristic of the internal subsidy is its
low visibility, which impedes responsible review. The amounts and recipients
of direct subsidies are ordinarily specifically stated, but this is not the case with
internal subsidies."246
The Adamson Act provides an interesting historical example of
taxation by regulation.247 Congress adopted the Act during the Woodrow
Wilson administration, and its purpose was to avert a threatened strike by
railroad workers. The Act temporarily required railroad companies to increase
the wages they paid. Congress could have accomplished its objective by having
the Treasury write checks to railroad workers to supplement their pay. But
doing so would have made the cost of the Act explicit and would have clearly
identified who would foot the bill for the scheme (i.e., federal taxpayers).
The problem of low-salience regulatory costs is also reflected in a
tendency to focus on isolated aspects of government interventions, ignoring
their systemic effects. As a result, political actors systematically underestimate
the unintended consequences of regulation.248 In particular, they frequently fail
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Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2

244

Id. at 29.

245

id.

BELL

J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 22, 43 (1971).

Id. at 43; cf Gamage & Shanske, supra note 239, at 51-53 ("[V]oters may not appreciate
the burdens imposed by regulation to the same degree as they would the burdens imposed by
taxes, such that using regulation as a substitute for tax-financed spending may have less political
salience."). Richard Epstein goes even further than Posner. He argues that the government should
not redistribute wealth, for example, by requiring that employers provide health insurance to their
employees or that landlords supply apartments at below-market rents. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES,
supra note 34, at 145-46. Epstein views this as a form of "off-budget financing" that undermines
democratic accountability. Id. Epstein's position is that the government should finance this type
of benefit out of general tax revenues: "When the expenditures are made explicit through the
budget process, the public is better able to make an informed choice about the costs and benefits
of the program." Id. at 146.
247
This example comes from HIGGS, supra note 159, at 116-21.
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SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note

152, at 39-40; Hirshleifer, supra note 16,
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to account for the fact that intervention is subject to unraveling, which occurs
when individuals take steps to offset the effects of regulation (usually at some
cost). 2 49 For example, people respond to legally mandated automobile safety
devices by taking more risks when driving, which substantially reduces the
number of lives saved.250 Similarly, smokers respond to cigarette taxes by
switching to cigarettes that are higher in tar and nicotine and by smoking each
cigarette more intensely-both of which make smoking more dangerous. 2 5 1 A
third example is the increase in air travel regulations occurring after the 9/11
terrorist attacks. The regulations increased the cost of flying, which shifted
travelers toward driving. Because driving is riskier than flying, the regulations
likely contributed to a large number of deaths.2 52
Failure to account for the hidden costs of regulation is exacerbated by
the fact that legislation is often adopted in response to a perceived emergency.
David Hirshleifer notes that "the costs of regulation, though widely incurred,
are often far less salient than the exceptional wrongdoings that incited it." 2 53 As
a result, salient events can create an intense demand for legislation that
precludes careful consideration of regulatory costs. Stephen Choi and A.C.
Pritchard colorfully describe this phenomenon at work in the context of
financial regulation: "'Fraud led to the market crash that wiped out your
will reduce
savings!' is easier to sell to voters . . than '[e]xcessive regulations
2 54
your investment gains by one-half of one percent per year! "'
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), discussed above, provides a
prominent example of legislation resulting from salient events and less salient
regulatory costs. 2 55 The Enron debacle that led to SOX was particularly
compelling because it provided vivid narratives, including greedy executives
who sold their own Enron stock prior to the collapse while telling lower-level

at 859; Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 13, at 1068-69; see also Peter J. Boettke,
Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, Takings, 8 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 327, 337 (2010)
("[T]he key costs of takings are 'hidden.' They involve foregone entrepreneurial opportunitiesdiscoveries never made and new forms of wealth never produced-because intervention directed
the market process down some alternative, politically determined path.").
249
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 152, at 133-34 (discussing "healthhealth tradeoffs," which occur when a regulation designed to reduce one risk causes people to
respond in a way that increases some other risk).
250
Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN. 677, 717
(1975).
251
Gary Lucas, Jr., Saving Smokers from Themselves: The Paternalistic Use of Cigarette
Taxes, 80 U. CIN. L. REv. 693, 733-34 (2012) [hereinafter Lucas, Cigarette Taxes] (reviewing
the evidence).
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Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali & Daniel H. Simon, The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport
Security Measures on the DemandforAir Travel, 50 J. L. & ECON. 731, 751-52 (2007).
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Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 859.
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employees that the stock was a great investment for their retirement
accounts.256 Many Enron employees were heavily invested in the company's
stock and were ruined financially when the company imploded. Consistent with
the hypothesis that salient events lead to legislation that ignores regulatory
costs, Roberta Romano argues that in adopting SOX, Congress ignored
substantial evidence that the law's corporate governance provisions were illconceived and would not work.257
I.

Opportunity Cost Neglect: IgnoringImplicit Tradeoffs

Some scholars are skeptical of certain government interventions on the
grounds that they are ineffective, excessively costly, and inimical to economic
growth.258 But opinion research shows that the public enthusiastically embraces
government spending, tax expenditures, and regulation. 2 59 Moreover, affection
for government is not limited to liberals and Democrats. Conservatives and
Republicans also express strong support for government as long as researchers
ask them about specific programs rather than asking about government in
abstract or general terms.
Nonetheless, opinion research also reveals that support for many
government programs declines (often substantially) when researchers draw
attention to the programs' opportunity costs. 26 1 The opportunity cost of a
government program consists of the private and public goods that society must
forgo to make that program possible. Opinion research suggests that unless
explicitly prompted to consider these costs, the public often ignores them. 2 62
Opportunity cost neglect is consistent with the finding that decision makers
focus on salient situational elements and irrationally ignore implicit
information. The benefits of many government programs are obvious, but their
opportunity costs are often implicit and therefore easy to overlook. In

256
257

258

Id. at 858.
Romano, supra note 198, at 1528.
E.g.,
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A CROSS-COUNTRY

EMPIRICAL STUDY 26 (1997) (finding that greater government spending, and the associated
taxation, reduces economic growth); WINSTON, supra note 95; Simeon Djankov et al., The
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democratic governments . .. [and the] principal beneficiaries appear to be the politicians and
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259 Lucas, Opportunity Cost Neglect, supra note 17, at 296; Tasic, Growth of Government,
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particular, because the payment of taxes is usually not tightly connected to the
receipt of government benefits, those benefits often appear to be free.
Opportunity cost neglect is related to but distinct from the tendency to
ignore hidden taxes and regulatory costs. When taxes and regulatory costs are
hidden, voters underestimate their amount in dollar terms, which also conceals
the opportunity costs of government programs. Making the dollar cost of
particular programs explicit increases the likelihood that voters will then think
about opportunity costs. But even when voters know a program's cost in dollar
terms, they do not always take the next step and consider that incurring that
cost entails sacrificing specific public and private goods. Considered in the
abstract, a program's dollar cost is simply a number that voters may fail to link
to sacrificed resources. To illustrate, imagine the difference in psychological
impact of notifying voters that ten F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets cost $700
million versus notifying them that purchasing the ten jets means that the
government would have to cancel plans to build 50 new elementary schools.263
The latter formulation is more likely to trigger consideration of opportunity
costs because it makes those costs explicit.
Widespread neglect of the opportunity costs of government programs
has several implications.2 64 First, it artificially increases the demand for direct
spending, tax expenditures, and regulation above the level that voters would
otherwise support. In particular, opportunity cost neglect helps explain chronic
budget deficits. Voters express strong support for government spending, but at
the same time, they are also unwilling to pay for it. Second, opportunity cost
neglect results in a misallocation of government funds. Specifically, opinion
research suggests that the federal government spends more on the military and
less on other programs than it would if voters were cognizant of the tradeoffs
involved. Finally, opportunity cost neglect affects the government's choice of
policy instruments. Voters are attracted to policies that conceal tradeoffs. This
explains why voters generally prefer tax expenditures to similar direct spending
programs.26 5 It also explains why, despite economists' objections, voters prefer
to address global warming through command-and-control regulations, which
conceal the opportunity costs of environmental protection, rather than a carbon
tax, which would make those costs more salient.
In combination with the intentions heuristic, opportunity cost neglect
also helps explain why the government often structures transfers to special
267
Many government programs transfer
interest groups in inefficient ways.
money from one group (consumers or taxpayers) to another (producers or other
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special interests).2 6 8 Farm subsidies are an example. 2 6 9 Transfers to special
interests are usually structured inefficiently, meaning that they create a larger
deadweight loss than necessary. 270 A transfer program creates a deadweight
loss when the benefit of the program to the special interest group is less than
the harm to consumers and taxpayers. Government could structure transfers
efficiently by imposing a tax and transferring the revenue collected to the
favored special interest group. 271 This would minimize the deadweight loss and
potentially make everyone better off. But the government rarely uses taxes and
direct payments to carry out special interest transfers; instead, it relies on less
* *
272
efficient means such as acreage limitations.
While inefficient transfers are puzzling to economists, politicians find
them useful because these devices make it possible to conceal special interest
legislation using public interest rhetoric.273 Although a significant portion of
farm subsidies go to wealthy farmers and large corporations,2 74 politicians
claim that the subsidies are necessary to provide farmers with a stable income
and to protect the national interest by reducing food imports. 275 This claim
suggests to the public that the subsidies are motivated by good intentions.
Moreover, the use of inefficient transfer mechanisms hides the true recipients
of the transfers from public view while making the opportunity costs less
salient than they would be if the government used taxes and direct payments.
Opportunity cost neglect also interacts with action bias.276 As discussed
in Section C of this Part, Robert Higs has shown that crises contribute
significantly to government growth.
Higgs concludes that "[u]nder
conditions widely agreed to constitute a national emergency . . . Americans
both expect and desire the government to 'do something,' and to do it

268
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immediately." 27 8 Politicians respond by adopting legislation, which is often
structured so as to conceal the true cost of intervention.279 Once the government
intervenes, the benefits (and beneficiaries) of the intervention become obvious,
but the opportunity costs remain hidden, which makes the new program
virtually impossible to eliminate.2 80
J.

Ignoring the Hidden Benefits of Government

Many of the failures of rationality that we have discussed up to this
point suggest that voters and politicians are overly eager to embrace
government intervention and that government is likely larger and more
powerful than it would be in a world populated by rational actors. But some
scholars argue that government is too small. 2 8 1 The idea is that the benefits of
government are hidden because they are indirect or occur in the future, so
voters underestimate them.282 Yair Listokin and David Schizer argue that the
government should combat this problem by taking steps to make the benefits
that it provides more salient, including engaging in advertising campaigns that
highlight popular government programs.283 While Listokin and Schizer's
proposal is open to criticism,

2 84

the claim that people ignore some of the

benefits of government warrants further research. If this claim is true, then the
failure to fully account for hidden benefits could at least partially counteract the
biases that lead voters to ignore the cost of government programs.

Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 62-67. For discussion of how politicians can conceal the cost of government
intervention, see Part III.G-H.
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PLOus, supra note 64, at 164 ("People seldom pay as much attention to events that do not occur
as those that do.") (internal citation omitted).
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR COPING WITH IRRATIONALITY IN GOVERNMENT

Despite the problems identified in this Article, democracy generally
performs better than alternative systems of government.285 Compared to
dictatorships and oligarchies, democracies are relatively prosperous and
peaceful, and democratic governments are less likely to adopt catastrophic
policies and to murder their own citizens. So democracy is here to stay.
Nonetheless, we have shown that irrationality can cause democracies to adopt
bad laws. What can be done to avoid this problem or at least limit the damage?
This Part discusses various proposals for coping with irrationality in a
democracy. For ease of exposition, we organize our discussion around two
categories of proposals. The first category aims to reduce irrationality in
policymaking without severely restricting the scope of government. The second
category assumes that irrationality presents an insurmountable obstacle to
effective government and for that reason, aims to limit government's scope.
Our discussion of these proposals is not exhaustive. Our goal is simply to
highlight the most important proposed solutions to the problem of irrationality
among political actors as well as the primary criticisms of each proposal.
Before turning to the various proposals, we first address a possible
objection that applies to all of them to a greater or lesser extent. Some scholars
may view these proposals as undemocratic or even paternalistic. Perhaps the
public should be free to choose policies and politicians for any reason even if
its choices are irrational.
We will revisit this objection throughout our discussion in this Part. For
now, we merely suggest that despite this objection, taking steps to address
irrationality might be justified on two grounds.286 First, a voter who supports
harmful policies and dangerous politicians imposes an externality on the rest of
society. Irrational voting is therefore a matter of public concern and steps to
remedy it are not necessarily paternalistic. Second, we have seen that irrational
voters may favor policies that frustrate the voters' intended objectives. For
example, antiforeign bias may cause voters to support protectionist policies
because they erroneously believe those policies are good for the economy.
Arguably, voters would want to avoid this type of error if they understood that
they were making it.

SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supranote 29, at 9.
This argument is based upon SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 4-7. Somin
makes the argument to justify his concerns about voter ignorance. But the argument also applies
to concerns about irrationality among political actors.
285
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Reducing Irrationalityin Policymaking

A.

This Section discusses proposals for achieving more rational policies.
These range from educating voters on important issues to ceding control of
particular policy areas to government bureaucrats and other experts.
1.

Deliberation Day

Recognizing the general public's political ignorance, Bruce Ackerman
287
and James Fishkin have proposed Deliberation Day as a remedy.
Deliberation Day would be a national holiday that would occur prior to
presidential (and possibly congressional) elections with all registered voters
invited to attend and to discuss important issues at meetings that would be held
at various venues throughout the country. 288 The proceedings would begin with
a televised debate between the candidates that would be followed by a series of
small- and large-group discussions, with some of the discussions involving
input from local political officials and party representatives. To encourage
289
participation, the government would pay $150 to citizens who participate.
Ackerman and Fishkin have worked out their proposal in some detail, including
estimating its cost. Their primary evidence for the potential effectiveness of
2 90
In
Deliberation Day stems from experiments involving deliberative polls.
these experiments, a small group of subjects meet for several days with experts
and political officials to discuss one or more political issues. The results show
that many subjects change their minds on important issues as a result of the
deliberative process.
Although Ackerman and Fishkin present Deliberation Day primarily as
a response to widespread political ignorance, it also has the potential to reduce
voter irrationality. For example, if deliberating groups are politically
heterogeneous, then exposure to arguments on both sides of an issue might
mitigate ideological bias and make it psychologically difficult for voters to
cling to cherished (but false) beliefs.291 Similarly, Deliberation Day might
result in voters having better information about various risks relevant to public
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policy, which might in turn reduce the negative influence of the availability
heuristic.
Despite its promise, Deliberation Day has drawbacks. First, the
proposal may never be adopted. The politicians who would have to vote to
create it would also be people who have succeeded in politics without it.2 92
Why would they support a major change to the status quo? Second, the number
of issues deliberated and the depth in which they could be considered would
necessarily be severely limited.293 So even if we assume that deliberation
mitigates irrationality, irrationality would still influence public opinion on
many important matters.
Finally, deliberation will not necessarily mitigate irrationality. In
support of their claim of deliberation's salutary effects, Ackerman and Fishkin
cite evidence that deliberative polling influences opinion and in particular that
it increases support for interventionist policies, such as more stringent fueleconomy standards, as well as a strong welfare state.294 Unfortunately, evidence
that deliberation would increase support for policies that Ackerman and Fishkin
apparently find appealing does not prove that deliberation promotes
rationality.2 95
In fact, a recent experiment by David Schkade and his colleagues
suggests that the opposite may be true.296 Ackerman and Fishkin place great
value on deliberative polls, but the results of those polls may be misleading.
Deliberative polls are often structured so as to create a diverse group of
subjects representative of the national electorate, a feature that ensures
heterogeneity along many dimensions. But the Deliberation Day meetings
proposed by Ackerman and Fishkin would occur at local venues where
participants would be more homogeneous than the subjects in carefully
designed deliberative polls. Schkade's study replicated this condition by asking
groups of people from Colorado to deliberate three controversial political
issues.297 Subjects in some of the groups lived in Boulder, a predominantly
liberal city, while subjects in other groups lived in Colorado Springs, a
predominantly conservative city. Schkade found that with respect to all three
issues, deliberation caused the groups from Boulder to become more liberal and
the groups from Colorado Springs to become more conservative.2 98 In other
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words, when liberals and conservatives deliberated with like-minded people,
they moved further apart from one another. Deliberation also significantly
reduced diversity of opinion within the various groups so that even anonymous
opinions expressed by subjects became more extreme and less diverse.299
Based on these results, Schkade concluded "that deliberation among
like-minded people produced ideological amplification-an amplification of
preexisting ideological tendencies, in which group discussion leads to greater
extremism." 300 In this instance, rather than mitigating ideological bias,
deliberation exacerbated it. Moreover, Schkade's findings are consistent with a
more general phenomenon that social psychologists refer to as group
polarization-the tendency for group discussion to push the opinions of a group
of people further in the direction in which the group initially leaned.30 1
2.

Encouraging Reliance on Political Activists

Attempts to educate and debias the general public may mitigate
irrationality to some extent but are unlikely to have a large effect because
biases are deeply ingrained and voters are busy people with limited capacity for
processing political information.302 Nonetheless, democracy might still work
well if voters rely on informed activists who take the time to carefully evaluate
political issues. 0 3 These activists could be political junkies, celebrities,
members of special interest organizations, or experts in fields related to public
3
policy. 0

Reliance on political activists can, however, be problematic. First,
activists differ demographically from the rest of the population and tend to be
more extreme in their views.30 5 Second, to increase their own power, status, and
wealth, activists often have an incentive to exaggerate political problems and to

299

Id. at 923-24.

300

Id at 917.

301

GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 66, at 471-75.

302
See, e.g., McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra note 56, at 129 ("There is reason
to be skeptical, however, that debiasing techniques alone will fully succeed, given the depth of
some of the mental habits, the complexity of tax, and the low payoffs for individuals for fully
understanding tax law.").
303
See generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA:
CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNow? (1998). For critical reviews of the literature
supporting voter reliance on political activists, see SoMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note
29, at 97-100; Ilya Somin, Resolving the DemocraticDilemma?, 16 YALE J. REG. 401, 405-11
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emphasize governmental solutions over the free market.306 Third, voters have
little incentive to determine which activists are reliable and often have no way
of evaluating their performance since it is difficult to determine the effects of
the policies that activists advocate.3 07 In this respect, contrast activists with
private sector specialists such as doctors who risk ruining their reputations if
they perform poorly as measured by objectively verifiable outcomes. Finally,
the public often listens to particular activists, not because of their expertise, but
because they are entertaining or confirm existing views.30 s For example, one
study found that subjects respected the views of Rush Limbaugh and Phil
Donahue on new prison construction, 3 09 even though there is little reason to
believe that these two talk show hosts know much about the subject.31 0
3.

Literacy Tests and Voting Restrictions

Although the evidence is mixed, some research indicates that rational
behavior increases with cognitive ability.3 11 In addition, researchers have found

that training can be an effective tool for improving people's ability to reason.312
For example, Richard Larrick and his colleagues find that formal training in
economics is associated with the use of cost-benefit rules in every-day decision
making.
This research strengthens the case for literacy tests and other voting
restrictions designed to limit the vote to those with relatively high cognitive
ability and education levels. It also partially undermines the rationale for getout-the-vote drives and other efforts to increase voter participation in

306
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elections.3 14 People who already vote are more educated than those who do not,
so increasing voter turnout will likely produce a less educated electorate.
Nonetheless, even if intelligence and education increase the likelihood
that a person will act rationally when making decisions that directly affect him
personally, that does not imply that those characteristics lead to rational voting.
As noted in Part II, one of the reasons that voters are so often uninformed and
irrational is that they have little incentive to take voting seriously. That is true
whether they are educated or not. In fact, since educated people generally earn
higher incomes, devoting time to politics imposes greater opportunity costs
upon them than upon the uneducated.315
Moreover, the empirical evidence directly pertaining to the effects of
education on voter rationality is mixed. With respect to economic policy, there
is evidence suggesting that people who are more educated tend to think more
like economists even after controlling for confounding variables such as
income and partisan affiliation.' 16 On the other hand, those who are most
informed about political matters tend to be the most biased in evaluating
political information.1 In addition, in recent decades, education levels have
risen and advances in information technology have made political information
easier to obtain, yet political ignorance and voter irrationality remain
widespread.
Even if we assume that educated people vote more rationally than the
uneducated, restricting the vote to educated persons presents serious problems.
Education levels vary across demographic categories. In particular, the
politically well-informed differ from the rest of the public in terms of race,
income, gender, religion, ideology, and other attributes.3 19 So the group of
educated voters, and especially of those who are politically well-informed, is
not demographically representative of the public generally. Given this fact,
excluding the uneducated and the uninformed would likely undermine the
perceived legitimacy of elections and of the laws adopted by elected
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officials.320 More importantly, it would mean that the interests of excluded
groups would be underrepresented. Altruistic voting by the educated minority
would partially alleviate this problem. But voters do not always vote
altruistically. And even when they do, they might not give the same weight to
the interests of all members of society. 321 As we discussed in Part III, in-group
bias causes people to value their own in-groups (including racial and ethnic ingroups) more than others, and it affects public opinion on political matters.
4.

Reliance on Bureaucrats and Other Experts

Scholars who study irrationality among voters and politicians
sometimes recommend that the government rely more on bureaucrats and other
experts to design policies and write rules.322 Jeremy Blumenthal reviews
evidence that within their particular domains, experts often make better
decisions than lay persons in part because experts have techniques for avoiding
the effects of cognitive limitations and biases.323 Experts appear to have a
number of advantages over novices, including greater ability to integrate
information and make consistent judgments.324
Because of the advantages that come with expertise, delegating power
to administrative agencies could mitigate the effects of irrationality on public
policy. More specifically, the bureaucracy creates some slack that could allow
the government to ignore voters when the policies that they demand are
irrational. Voters may underestimate the ability of politicians to control
bureaucratic decision making.32 5 If so, politicians can delegate difficult
People place inherent value on the ability to participate in democratic decision making.
E.g., Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Public Choice, 144 PUB. CHOICE 557, 56667 (2010).
320

321

SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supranote 29, at 113.

The primary argument for delegating authority to bureaucrats and other experts is that they
possess more and better information than voters and politicians. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW
C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 351-52 (2d ed. 2013). But recent scholarship
also cites voter irrationality as a justification. E.g., BREYER, supra note 248, at 59-80; SUNSTEIN,
RISK AND REASON, supra note 152, at 54-55; McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra
note 56, at 130.
323
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism, 64 FLA. L. REv. 721, 749-55 (2012). For
additional cites to the literature on experts and irrationality, see Bruno S. Frey & Reiner
Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Transform PsychologicalAnomalies, 23 J. EcoN. BEHAV.
ORG. 215, 224 (1994) [hereinafter Frey & Eichenberger, Economic Incentives].
324 K. Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith, Prospects and Limits of the Empirical Study of
Expertise: An Introduction, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF EXPERTISE: PROSPECTS AND
LIMITS 1, 20-33 (K. Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith eds., 1991); Baron, supra note 94, at 20304.
325
CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 172-73. For a discussion of the mechanisms that
&

322

politicians use to control administrative agencies, see generally MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra

note 322, at 406-544.
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decisions to bureaucrats and then plausibly deny responsibility for those
decisions. 3 26 Employing this techni ue, civic-minded politicians could use the
bureaucracy to improve the law.
In particular, because administrative
agencies generally have to conduct cost-benefit analyses in connection with
major regulatory actions,328 delegating more authority to them might facilitate
rational decision making.
Despite these potential benefits, shifting power to the bureaucracy is
fraught with problems. First, it is unlikely that experts will ever be given
complete control. Instead, they face political constraints. 3 29 Top-level
bureaucrats in particular are selected by and generally held accountable to
politicians,3 30 who may themselves be irrational. Moreover, while the public
may underestimate politicians' control over bureaucrats, agencies do not have
free reign to ignore voters. 33 1 As a result, voter ignorance and irrationality are
"likely to reduce the quality of any delegations to experts that are enacted into
law." 332
Second, to the extent that bureaucrats do in fact have the power to act
independently, they may abuse it. In particular, they might be motivated to
protect their jobs and salaries, to enhance their reputations, to maximize the
budget and power of their respective agencies, or to advance the agenda of
special interest groups to which they are sympathetic.333
Finally, while bureaucrats and other experts may be less prone than
non-experts to exhibit certain types of irrationality, they are not fully rational.
Experts suffer from many of the same biases as lay people; indeed, they are
likely to be especially susceptible to certain biases.3 34 This helps explain why

326
327

MANNING & STEPHENSON,

supra note 322, at 353-54.
See CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 172-76; cf Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 737

(arguing that when voters are biased, politicians should ignore their demands for regulation and
defer to experts).
328
MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 322, at 515.
329

Cf SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 152, at 126-28 (arguing in favor of cost-

&

benefit analysis of proposed government regulations but noting that the public often disapproves
of the procedure because it requires making "taboo tradeoffs," such as stating explicitly that the
costs of some regulations are too high even if they save lives).
330
See generally id. at 406-539.
331
BREYER, supra note 248, at 20 ("Agency priorities and agendas may more closely reflect
public rankings [of environmental risks], politics, history, or even chance than the kind of
priority list that environmental experts would deliberately create. To a degree, that is
inevitable.").
332
SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 184.
3
For a review of several models of bureaucratic behavior, see MUELLER, supra note 23, at
359-85.
334
E.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 25-27 (discussing the influence of the availability
heuristic on bureaucrats within the Securities and Exchange Commission); Daniel Kahneman
Jonathan Renshon, Why Hawks Win, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 34-38 (presenting
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experts in a particular subject area are frequently no better than non-experts in
making predictions relevant to that area.335 Procedural safeguards such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review of agency decisions may
reduce the influence of irrationality in bureaucratic decision making. 3 36 But
these safeguards are not perfect and can in fact introduce new biases of their
own.

337

A comprehensive catalogue of experts' biases lies outside the scope of
this Article. 3 Here, we simply highlight a few of the most important sources
of expert irrationality and discuss how they influence the law. In particular, we
discuss the tendency of bureaucrats and other experts (1) to suffer from tunnel
vision, which contributes to cognitive regulatory capture; (2) to engage in
motivated reasoning or path-dependent filtering of information, leading to
spirals of conviction; and (3) to succumb to the illusion of regulatory
competence, which results in policies that have unanticipated and unintended
consequences.
i.

Tunnel Vision and Cognitive Regulatory Capture

Experts sometimes suffer from tunnel vision,339 which is a form of
focusing illusion that works in combination with opportunity cost neglect. 34 0

&

historical evidence that in international conflicts, political decision makers are biased in favor of
war and against non-military solutions); Colin R. Kuehnhanss, Bruno Hyndels & Katharina
Hilken, Choice in Politics: Equivalency Framing in Economic Policy Decisions and the
Influence of Expertise, EUR. J. POL. EcoN. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5-11) (presenting
experimental evidence that experts are as susceptible as novices to framing effects in making
economic policy decisions); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 63, at 558-61.
3
For an empirical study of expert performance with respect to political judgment, see
generally PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS IT? How CAN WE
KNow? (2005). Tetlock finds that experts generally do not perform much better than simple
algorithms or dilettantes in the field and that it is especially hard to discern who the real experts
are. Id. at 54-59. The conventional yardsticks such as academic training and professional
experience do not correlate strongly with expert performance. Id. at 54. Similarly, Loren
Lomasky points out that the 2008 financial crisis demonstrates that the activities of economic and
financial experts may do more economic damage than policies supported by the typical voter.
Loren Lomasky, Swing and a Myth: A Review of Caplan 's The Myth of the Rational Voter, 135
PUB. CHOICE 469, 478-79 (2008).
336
Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 63, at 588-600.
337
Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 37.
33
For detailed discussions of irrationality among bureaucrats and experts, see generally Choi
& Pritchard, supra note 99, at 21-40; Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 16; Rachlinski & Farina,
supra note 63; Tasic, Are RegulatorsRational?, supra note 95.
339 For discussions of tunnel vision among bureaucrats, see generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS
TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 363-66 (2009); BREYER,
supra note 248, at 11-19.
340
See Lucas, Opportunity Cost Neglect, supra note 17, at 324.

254

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

Bureaucrats who believe strongly in their agency's mission and other experts
who are focused upon the particular problems addressed in their respective
fields sometimes ignore relevant information and competing interests and adopt
or advocate policies that do more harm than good. 34 1 For example, public
health advocates are so focused on health issues that the policies they advocate
may give disproportionate weight to health concerns and ignore competing
factors such as autonomy.34 2 In particular, they may discount the possibility that
some people might rationally sacrifice good health to pursue other objectives.
Similarly, W. Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer have argued that
administrative agencies systematically overstate certain risks,343 which is a
tendency that stems from bureaucratic tunnel vision. For example, in
administering the Superfund hazardous waste cleanup program, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducts formal risk assessments to
determine the risk level posed by particular hazardous waste sites. Viscusi and
Gayer explain how various assumptions and procedures that the EPA
incorporates into its risk assessments contribute to a conservatism bias that
causes the EPA to significantly exaggerate the risks posed by these sites.344 The
bias in favor of overstating risks would not occur if the agency took a broader
view and considered the opportunity cost of excessive environmental
regulation.
In extreme cases, tunnel vision can lead to cognitive regulatory capture,
which occurs when bureaucrats "internali[ze], as if by osmosis, the objectives,
interests and perception of reality of the vested interest they are meant to
regulate and supervise in the public interest instead." 34 5 Willem Buiter has
argued that cognitive regulatory capture caused the Federal Reserve to respond
to the 2008 financial crisis with policies that helped the financial sector to the
detriment of the broader economy. According to Buiter, the Federal Reserve
pursued obviously inferior policies because it "listens to Wall Street and

341
See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 33-35 (discussing the tendency of bureaucrats at
the Securities and Exchange Commission to engage in groupthink and criticizing "the SEC's
single-minded focus on investor protection"); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 63, at 580
("[A]gencies can become myopically focused on their missions."); Tasic, Are Regulators
Rational?, supra note 95, at 6 (arguing that focusing illusion may cause regulators to "be deluded
that they are doing the right thing because they are unable to see the wider context"); cf
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 13, at 1071-72 (arguing that when people consider in
isolation questions such as how much they would be willing to pay to protect coral reefs or to
protect the elderly, the resulting answers are often incoherent in the sense that they differ from
the answers given when people consider these questions simultaneously).
342
Lucas, Psychic Taxes, supra note 306, at 294.
343
Viscusi & Gayer,supra note 145, at 991.
344 Id. at 991-93.

345
Willem H. Buiter, Lessons from the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (May 28, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York),
http://newyorkfed.org/research/conference/2008/rnum/buiter.pdf.
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believes what it hears . . [and] is too close to the financial markets and leading
financial institutions, and too responsive to their special pleadings, to make the
right decisions for the economy as a whole."3 4 6
ii. IdeologicalBias and Spirals of Conviction
Recall that ideological bias influences policy preferences as well as
how people interpret new information. Recall also that ideological bias has at
least two potential causes-(1) cherishing certain beliefs and engaging in
motivated reasoning to preserve them; and (2) path-dependent filtering of
information over time. Both of these explanations of ideological bias suggest
that experts will not be immune to it and may in fact be particularly vulnerable.
First, experts may cherish certain beliefs because of the material and
psychological benefits of doing so. Take, for example, the recent wave of
paternalistic proposals such as cigarette and soda taxes intended to save people
from what certain experts deem to be irrational behavior. 347 Implementing these
proposals would come at a cost, including loss of freedom and potential for
government abuse. The cost may or may not be worth it, but what cannot be
denied is that many experts have strong personal and professional incentives to
support paternalistic policies. 348 The work of academics who study irrationality
becomes more important if it lays the foundation for government action.
Moreover, paternalistic intervention allows bureaucrats to assert greater control
over market exchanges and enhance their power. In addition, bureaucrats and
other experts can enhance their self-esteem and reputations by advocating
policies that will prevent people from making what the experts themselves
regard as bad choices.
Having a strong incentive to favor paternalistic policies may cause
experts to wrongly conclude that paternalism is desirable-an instance of
motivated reasoning.350 Experts who advocate paternalism may focus on its
potential benefits while ignoring the costs, particularly those that are not

346

Id. at 36.

347
For a discussion of paternalistic cigarette taxes, see generally Lucas, Cigarette Taxes,
supra note 251.
348
Lucas, Psychic Taxes, supra note 306, at 294.

349
See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'PerfectRationality Should Not Be Traded
for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 (2002)
("Behavioral law and economics scholars simplify and overgeneralize findings on human
cognition and rationality to make these findings seem simultaneously important and simple
enough to be incorporated into legal policy.").
350
See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 47-48 (discussing the tendency of bureaucrats to
interpret information in a way consistent with their mental model of how the world works);
Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, supra note 95, 4-5.

256

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 118

obvious.5 1 Stephen Choi and A.C. Pritchard make a similar point about
bureaucrats:
[C]ognitive illusions may magnify the harm caused by the
more self-interested regulators. Regulators do not fit neatly
into either the opportunistic or completely selfless boxes-a
range of motivations exists. Within this range, cognitive biases
may encourage regulators to equate self-interest and the public
interest. An overoptimistic regulator, for example, may be able
to delude himself into believing that a regulatory change,
which coincidentally increases the prestige and power of the
regulator's position, also benefits the market.352
The views of experts may also be biased due to path-dependent
filtering of information over time. Jeffrey Friedman argues that experts may be
particularly prone to the spirals of conviction discussed in Part III. If so, then
the choice between democracy and government by experts involves placing
authority either in the hands of the relatively open-minded but ignorant masses
or the informed but closed-minded elite:
The social sciences offer theoretical "ideologies" in
abundance.... Social scientists are likely to come to see the
world in the very distinct manners that are typical of these
disciplines, and to dismiss the literature of the other
disciplines-if they even read it-as hopelessly naive or selfabsorbed.... The implications may be quite disturbing: the
experts on whom a technocracy relies may be locked into their
theoretical biases, their opinions constrained by the mountains
of information these biases allow them, over time, to perceive
and register as significant."'
iii. The Illusion ofRegulatory Competence

Leonid Rozenblit and Frank Keil have identified a form of
overconfidence that they refer to as the illusion of explanatory depth (IOED).3 54
The IOED causes people to overestimate their understanding of phenomena

3s1
Cf Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1639 (2006) ("If the paternalist invests
significant political capital to advance paternalistic policies, the pressure to find evidence
confirming the need for paternalism is likely to be significant as well, making the likelihood of a
self-fulfilling prophecy quite high.").
352
Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 41.
3
Friedman, Dogmatism, supra note 165, at 134.
354
Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil, The MisunderstoodLimits of Folk Science: An Illusion of
ExplanatoryDepth, 26 COGNITIVE Sci. 521, 522 (2002).
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that seem simple on the surface but that are in fact complex. 5 In some cases,
people may understand the immediate causes of an event, but fail to appreciate
the root causes. Rozenblit and Keil present evidence that people overestimate
their understanding of phenomena such as the mechanics of helicopter flight
and how tides occur. 5
Slavisa Tasic has used this research to argue that bureaucrats and other
experts suffer from a special form of IOED, which he refers to as the illusion of
regulatory competence.35 7 Tasic argues that the problems targeted by
government policy, and especially economic policy, often seem simple and
easy to address, but in fact turn out to be more complicated than expected. As a
result, experts overestimate what government intervention can accomplish.
Tasic summarizes a large body of evidence that suggests that many policies are
358
undermined by unintended and unanticipated consequences.
He also argues
that the illusion of regulatory competence presents a major obstacle to effective
cost-benefit analysis. 359 If experts are overconfident in their understanding of
the economy and other complicated social phenomena, then they will fail to
identify and quantify all of the costs and benefits of their policy proposals.
B. Limiting Government's Scope
As we saw in the last Section, the proposals designed to overcome
irrationality and to yield better policies are all open to significant criticism. To
the extent that irrational policies are inevitable, it makes sense to consider
limiting the scope of government. 360 This Section briefly discusses various
proposals for achieving that objective.

3

356

Id. at 523-24.
Id. at 526-46.

3
Slavisa Tasic, The Illusion of Regulatory Competence, 21 CRIT. REv. 423, 428-33 (2009)
[hereinafter Tasic, Regulatory Competence]; see also Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 28-29
(providing examples of overconfidence among bureaucrats at the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
358
Tasic, Regulatory Competence, supra note 357, at 428-33. Though he did not have the
benefit of modem psychology, Friedrich Hayek made an argument similar to Tasic. He accused
economists of underestimating the complexity of the problems they faced when attempting to
improve upon outcomes that emerged spontaneously from market interactions. See generally
Friedrich Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
3
On the notion that cost-benefit analysis can serve as a remedy to irrationality in politics,
see generally Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 13 and SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON,
supra note 152.
360
Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 870-71.
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Constitutional Limitations and Legislative Roadblocks

Irrationality provides a rationale for constitutional limitations on
government power. For example, Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron argue
that balanced-budget amendments help combat focusing illusion and improve
public finance "by undermining the tendency to isolate out logically relevant
factors." 3 6 1 A second technique for restraining government action involves the
use of legislative roadblocks that make it difficult to enact new laws or that
limit the scope of laws that have been enacted. These roadblocks include the
separation of powers, supermajority voting rules, and sunset provisions.36 2
Similar to balanced-budget amendments, pay-go rules can assist in overcoming
focusing illusion by forcing the legislature to match spending increases (or tax
cuts) with tax increases (or spending cuts).363
A major drawback of using constitutional limitations and legislative
roadblocks to combat irrationality is that they can be difficult to adopt and in
some cases are easy to circumvent. For example, the U.S. Constitution is rarely
amended. Moreover, since the end of the Lochner Era in the late 1930s, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to use the Constitution as a means to
severely restrict the federal government's power, especially its power to adopt
economic regulations. In fact, a number of judges and scholars on both the
political left and right have objected that it would be antimajoritarian for an
unelected judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional on a regular basis. 3 64 This
view arguably ignores the role that irrationality plays in democracy.36 5
Nonetheless, judges may be unlikely to aggressively strike down laws as
unconstitutional out of fear that they do not have the power to impose their will
on the other branches of government or that they will undermine their own
legitimacy.366
2. Decentralization
Decentralization of government power entails a smaller scope for
higher levels of government, possibly including constitutional limits on the
federal government's power, and a larger scope for lower levels. One of the
virtues of decentralization is that it allows citizens to vote with their feet by
See McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra note 56, at 131.
362
See, e.g., Romano, supra note 198, at 1599-602 (advocating the use of sunset provisions in
emergency financial legislation).
363 McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra note 56, at 131.
361

3

For a review and critique of this literature, see SoMN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note

29, at 155-62.
365
For a similar argument defending judicial review on the basis of widespread public
ignorance on political matters, see id. at 155-69.
366
Id. at 156-59.
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moving to a jurisdiction where conditions are better and where the government
pursues policies that the individual citizen finds appealing.
In particular, as
Ilya Somin emphasizes, relative to ballot box voting, foot votin§ gives people
greater incentive to acquire information and to use it rationally.36 Unlike ballot
box voting, the decision to move to a different city or state has significant
personal consequences for the person making it. The personal importance of the
decision eliminates the collective action problem that plagues ballot box voting
and justifies the time and effort to collect and process information and to
overcome any tendency to interpret that information in a biased way. Somin
presents evidence that people moving across jurisdictions are generally well
informed compared to ballot box voters. 36 9
While decentralization has advantages, its benefits are limited. The
primary problem is that moving costs, which include the burden of changing
jobs and leaving behind friends and family, often exceed the benefits of
relocating to a jurisdiction with more appealing government policies. 370
Nonetheless, evidence from the United States and Europe suggests that many
people do move because of variation in public policy among jurisdictions.3 7 In
particular, people in the United States tend to migrate to states with relatively
high government consumption expenditures, relatively low tax rates, and
relatively more freedom with respect to labor market decisions.37 2 Moreover,
people often move because of job-related considerations, and public policy
likely plays a large role in the variation in employment conditions across
countries, states, and cities. 3 73
Another potentially significant drawback of decentralization is that in
practice, it likely requires constitutional limits on the federal government's
power.374 Members of the federal government have an incentive to expand its
power and revenue so that they can buy political support, and members of state
and local governments have an incentive to lobby for grants from the federal
government and for national laws that reduce political competition among
lower-level jurisdictions.375 Voters are not in a good position to oppose these
367

See, e.g., Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418

(1956).
368

SoMrN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 119-35.

369

Id. at 128-35.

370

Other criticisms of decentralization include the claim that it will set off destructive races to

the bottom, especially in environmental law, and the claim that it leads to the oppression of
minorities. For an argument that these criticisms are vastly overstated, see id. at 145-50.
37

See id. at 144-45 for a review of the evidence.
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Nathan J. Ashby, Economic Freedom and Migration Flows Between U.S. States, 73 S.

ECON. J. 677, 694 (2007).
3

Somm, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 145.
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Id. at 150-52.
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forces because they are uninformed both about the degree of centralization as
well as its benefits.376 As a result, ordinary political processes are likely to lead
to overcentralization.
3.

Greater Reliance on the Free Market

Some behavioral public choice scholars conclude that irrationality
among political actors is so serious a problem that it greatly strengthens the
case for a free market in which the government plays only a limited role.377
Skeptics of the free market might respond that irrationality affects private
actors as well. How do we know then whether society will be better off with
more government or less? This Article does not attempt to resolve that question
definitively. Instead, we simply discuss three reasons why irrationality might be
more detrimental to democracy than to the free market. 7 We then raise a
practical consideration: even if irrationality makes limited government more
desirable, limited government may be difficult to achieve and sustain in a world
populated by irrational political actors.
i.

PrivateActors Are Probably More Rational Than Political
Actors

There are at least three reasons to suspect that private actors are more
be rational than political actors. Private actors (1) have greater
to
likely
incentives to act rationally, (2) have more opportunities to identify and learn
from mistakes, and (3) face less complex and more familiar problems.
Political actors, especially voters, generally have less incentive to
recognize their irrationality and to find ways to overcome it than do private
actors. 3 79 As we have noted repeatedly, one vote rarely decides an election. In
addition, the consequences of most market decisions are largely confined to the

376

Id. at 166-68.

E.g., Hirshleifer, supra note 16, at 856 ("[T]he behavioral approach in some ways
3
strengthens the case for laissez-faire, and raises some new doubts about the value of regulation,
because much regulation is driven by psychological bias-on the part of the proponents, not
necessarily the regulated."); CAPLAN, MYTH, supra note 15, at 195-97.
Cf Lucas, Opportunity Cost Neglect, supra note 17, at 264-75 (arguing that opportunity
3
cost neglect is a more serious problem for voters than for consumers); Hirshleifer, supra note 16,
at 857 ("[A] behavioral approach suggests that even though markets work imperfectly, the
political process usually works even worse.").
Kent Daniel et al., Investor Psychology in Capital Markets: Evidence and Policy
37
Implications, 49 J. MONETARY EcoN. 139, 181 (2002) (stating that "the incentives of officials to
overcome their biases in evaluating the value of alternative policies are likely to be weak, as
contrasted with the incentive of market participants to improve their judgments to make trading
gains or avoid losses" and "individual voters have very weak incentives to avoid being fooled"
by special interest groups and political entrepreneurs).
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person responsible for them, while the costs and benefits of public policy are
mostly external to the decision makers.3 80 The fact that political actors have less
incentive to behave rationally is potentially important. Rationally evaluating
new information requires conscious effort, and failure to exert that effort
increases the influence of various biases.3 8
Not only do private actors have greater incentive to behave rationally,
they are often making less complex decisions. Consumers usually have
significant experience with the goods and services that they purchase, so they
are in a good position to evaluate their costs and benefits. Effective policy
making, on the other hand, requires detailed knowledge of esoteric subjects like
economics, national defense, and health care, and most people find these
subjects unfamiliar and daunting.382 Even experts in these fields struggle with
their complexity and often disagree about the best policies. Moreover, as we
have seen, government policies are frequently plagued by unforeseen
consequences, and there are reasons to believe that political actors greatly
underestimate the complexities of policy making.
In addition to bad incentives and complex decisions, political actors
383
have less opportunity than private actors to learn from errors. If a consumer
purchases a Dr. Pepper and finds out that she does not like the taste, she is
unlikely to make the same mistake again. But if a voter supports protectionism
or price controls believing that these policies are good for the economy, how
will she know if she was wrong? She has little incentive to identify and
evaluate the consequences of her preferred policies. And even if she did, the
effects are so complex that an adequate and objective assessment would require
expert help, which she is unlikely to seek.3 4 Moreover, any assessment in

380

Caplan, MajoritiesAgainst Utility, supra note 50, at 207-08 (pointing out that "voting for

bad policies has a built-in negative externality" because it hurts everyone).
381

KAHNEMAN, supra note 58, at 31-49.

Effective policy making is difficult when the government is addressing purported market
failures, such as externalities or monopolies. But it becomes even more complex when the
government acts paternalistically. Attempts to justify paternalism are the primary theme running
throughout the behavioral law and economics literature. But paternalistic policy making often
requires an enormous amount of information about the people whom the government is
regulating, including identifying their "true" preferences. See generally Lucas, Cigarette Taxes,
supra note 251.
Peter J. Boettke et al., Saving Government Failure Theory from Itself Recasting Political
383
Economy from an Austrian Perspective, 18 CONST. POL. EcON. 127, 138 (2007) ("[D]ecisions in
the market to either buy or abstain from buying are a direct signal to sellers, whereas in the
political process voters do not have the same extent of feedback opportunities with respect to
public policy offerings because they vote only periodically for representatives and their vote is
rarely decisive."); Frey & Eichenberger, Economic Incentives, supra note 323, at 224. On the
relationship between learning and rational behavior, see Klick & Mitchell, supra note 351, at
1627-38.
382

384

Cf SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, supra note 59, at 263 ("The picture of the prettiest girl that

ever lived will in the long run prove powerless to maintain the sales of a bad cigarette. There is
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which she does engage will almost certainly suffer from ideological bias and
motivated reasoning. Similarly, the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to
learn from prior policy decisions is inhibited by poor feedback and a tendency
to interpret subsequent events as vindicating the adopted policy.385

Better incentives, less complex decisions, and greater opportunities to
learn all suggest that private actors will make more rational decisions than
political actors. This conclusion is consistent with empirical evidence.386
Psychologists and behavioral economists have spent decades demonstrating
that test subjects err predictably in low-stakes laboratory experiments, which
frequently involve unfamiliar problems and novel decision environments. But
these findings often conflict with evidence from laboratory experiments that
incorporate substantial incentives for good performance, from field
experiments that closely mimic real-world decision environments, and from
studies of real-world behavior. People generally make more rational decisions
when faced with greater incentives to do so, when dealing with familiar
problems in their natural setting, and when given opportunities to learn and
seek assistance.387 To be sure, real-world market participants do sometimes act
no equally effective safeguard in the case of political decisions. Many decisions of fateful
importance are of a nature which makes it impossible for the public to experiment with them at
its leisure and at moderate cost. Even if that is possible, however, judgment is as a rule not so
easy to arrive at as it is in the case of the cigarette, because effects are less easy to interpret.").
385
E.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 44-45.
386
SOMIN, SMALLER GOVERNMENT, supra note 29, at 135-37; Caplan, Rational Irrationality,
supra note 15, at 14-20 (citing evidence that a low private cost increases irrationality); Edward
L. Glaeser, Paternalismand Psychology, 73 U. CI. L. REV. 133, 139-42 (2006) (citing evidence
that increased incentives reduce cognitive errors and concluding that "political beliefs should be
particularly erroneous because voters lack the incentives to learn the truth (after all one vote
doesn't determine anything)").
387
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LIBERALISM 213-18 (2003) (reviewing evidence that the endowment effect influences market
transactions less than laboratory experiments); Frey & Eichenberger, Economic Incentives, supra
note 323, at 225-26 (reviewing the literature on irrationality and incentives); Erik Hoelzl & Aldo
Rustichini, Overconfident: Do You Put Your Money on It?, 115 EcoN. J. 305 (2005) (finding that
overconfidence bias manifests itself less when people bet real money on their beliefs); Klick
Mitchell, supra note 351, at 1633-36 (reviewing evidence that incentives reduce irrational
behavior); John List, The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and

Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions, 114 J. POL. ECON. 1, 5-6 (2006) (finding that market
participants observed in their natural environment behave more like self-interested rational actors
than subjects in laboratory experiments); John List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect
Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 624 (2004) (finding that
consumers with significant market experience are less prone to the endowment effect); John List,
Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q. J. EcoN. 41, 70-71 (2003)
(finding that market experience plays a significant role in eliminating the endowment effect);
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal
Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033 (2012); Joshua D. Wright,
Behavioral Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2

N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 470, 477-82, 492-98 (2007) (discussing the lack of evidence of consumer
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irrationally. But irrational behavior appears to be more common in the
laboratory than in the market. By contrast, political actors often make decisions
in settings that resemble laboratory experiments in key respects-low personal
stakes for the decision maker, unfamiliar problems, and little opportunity to
learn from mistakes. This suggests that political actors will make low-quality
decisions.
ii. Arbitrage Mechanisms Mitigate Irrationalityin Private
Markets
Arbitrage mechanisms often limit the effects of irrationality in private
markets. As Edward McCaffery and Joel Slemrod point out, "competition in
consumer markets keeps prices at marginal cost, however much some
388
Similarly,
individual agents might be able to be tricked into paying more."
even if most stock market participants tend to buy high and sell low, stocks will
be valued appropriately as long as there is at least one rational actor who does
not face liquidity constraints. In other words, some irrational individuals will
suffer losses, but in the aggregate, the pricing system will be efficient.
Unfortunately, no general arbitrage mechanisms exist in the public
39 0
For example, a
sector, and politicians have little incentive to develop them.
irrationality in the credit card market and with respect to standard form contracts). Colin Camerer
and Robin Hogarth review 74 experimental studies and find evidence that incentives improve
performance on certain tasks but not others. In particular, they conclude that incentives matter
most in judgment and decision tasks, where they "improve performance in easy tasks that are
effort-responsive, like judgment, prediction, problem-solving, recalling items from memory, or
clerical tasks." Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-ProductionFramework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
7, 34 (1999). And when the stakes become higher, people move away from "favorable 'selfpresentation' behavior toward more realistic choices." Id Moreover, Camerer and Hogarth
suggest that experimental evidence understates the effect of incentives over long periods:
Our view is that experiments measure only short-run effects, essentially
holding capital fixed. The fact that incentives often do not induce different
(or better) performance in the lab may understate the effect of incentives in
natural settings, particularly if agents faced with incentive changes have a
chance to build up capital-take classes, seek advice, or practice.
Id. at 35.
388
Edward McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 3, 11 (Edward McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006).
389
id.
In some cases, intergovernmental competition may perform an arbitrage-like role in the
390
public sector. For example, Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron point out that while it may
be economically inefficient, the corporate income tax is cognitively appealing because its effects
are largely hidden from view. Yet the U.S. corporate income tax accounts for only a small part of
federal government revenues. A likely reason is that the United States faces competition for
corporate citizens from other countries. See McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra note
56, at 131.
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politician attempting to educate the public about hidden regulatory costs--even
if he could somehow attract voters' attention-cannot be sure that he or his
political party will benefit from the resulting efficiency gains. 391 In fact, the
effort may backfire because voters are not partial to politicians who deliver bad
news.392

iii. IrrationalityAmong PoliticalActors Imposes Significant
Damage
The damage resulting from irrational decisions will often be greater
when the decision maker is a political actor rather than a private actor. Private
actors who behave irrationally harm themselves and perhaps those close to
them. Political actors, on the other hand, can harm thousands or even millions
of people by causing the government to pursue irrational policies such as
unnecessary wars.
iv. Is SustainingSmall Government Impossible?
Even if we assume that greater reliance on the free market is desirable,
a practical problem presents itself. As we have seen, irrationality often biases
political actors in favor of government intervention, and substantial limitations
on government power are usually difficult to adopt and easy to circumvent.
One potential way to overcome this problem is to take advantage of
ideological bias. Indoctrinating voters and other political actors with free
market ideology might create a bulwark against government encroachment.3 9 4
Consistent with this hypothesis, Robert Higgs has argued that laissez-faire was
the predominant ideology in the United States in the late 19th century, which
made significant government expansion unthinkable. During the 20th century,
an ideological shift occurred and with it came a more interventionist state.
Nonetheless, attempts to manipulate the public through ideological bias
can be problematic. In addition to possible abuse, the practice may backfire.
For example, Republican politicians generally present themselves as favoring
lower taxes, less government spending, and less regulation. Not surprisingly,
Republican voters express more negative attitudes than Democratic voters
toward taxes, government spending, and regulation. However, Republican
hostility toward government spending and regulation is more apparent than

39

Id. at 130 ("Arbitrage mechanisms in the public sector are. . . largely public goods.").

392

id

3

See supra Part Ill.C.

Richard Layard makes a similar argument for purposefully shaping people's beliefs and
preferences. He argues that the school system should take advantage of happiness research and
indoctrinate students with beliefs and values that he believes will lead to happier lives. Richard
394

Layard, Happinessand the Teaching of Values, 12 CENTREPECE 18, 20-23 (2007).
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real. When poll questions are worded in abstract and general terms, many
Republicans say that they favor reductions in government spending and
regulation. But when asked about specific spending programs and particular
types of regulation, Republicans express a high level of support. 95 Many
Republicans do have a strong aversion to taxes. 39 6 But this hostility often
manifests itself in the form of tax-label aversion, 9 and not opposition to
government generally. Republicans generally support interventions for which
the costs are hidden, including tax expenditureS398 and regulations. And while
they claim to support deficit reduction, they do not favor the spending cuts
necessary to make it happen. In other words, the primary effect of the anti-tax,
free-market rhetoric prominent in Republican propaganda appears to be a
dislike among Republicans of government in the abstract that does not translate
into the desire to reduce the size and scope of specific programs. Republican
propaganda also has produced a disdain for taxes that increases the appeal of
tax expenditures, regulation, and deficit spending vis-d-vis traditional tax and
399
spending programs.
V. CONCLUSION

Our goal in this Article was to introduce legal scholars to behavioral
public choice. We have reviewed the major findings in the field, including a
discussion of the various biases and heuristics that impair the judgment of
political actors and that cause government failure. We have also described the

395 For a review of public opinion research on the attitudes of Republicans toward
government, see Lucas, OpportunityCost Neglect, supra note 17, at 280-83.
396
For a discussion of the psychological mechanism underlying Republicans' disdain for
taxes, see id. at 339-41.
397 See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 239, at 49-54 (reviewing the empirical evidence for
tax-label aversion).
398 For experimental evidence that Republicans are more likely to support tax expenditures
than similar direct spending programs, see Christopher Faricy & Christopher Ellis, Public
Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States: The Diference Between Direct Spending
and Tax Expenditures, 36 POL. BEHAv. 53, 71-72 (2014) ("[W]e find that the effects of the
delivery-mechanism frame on support for social programs was conditioned by partisanship. The
fact that the effects of the delivery-mechanism frame were stronger for Republicans than
Democrats could serve as an explanation for why Republicans, generally opposed to the idea of
'big government,' also on balance report preferences for higher levels of government spending
on specific social programs ... [a]t least some Republicans might view tax expenditure policy as
a way to have its policy cake and eat it, too: providing desirable social benefits while still
adhering to the values of individual initiative and support for the private sector.").
399
Cf Jonathan Baron & Edward McCaffery, Starving the Beast, The Psychology of Budget
Deficits, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 221-39
(Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008) (presenting experimental evidence' that the Republican
strategy of starve the beast, i.e., enacting tax cuts now to force spending cuts later, is likely to
cause budget deficits without having the intended effect of reducing the size of government).
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effects of irrationality on several specific areas of law and explained the
important proposals for mitigating the influence of irrationality on public
policy. Our hope is that our efforts will promote more realistic policy reforms

by helping legal scholars better understand the types of policies that are likely
to emerge from real-world political processes.

We also hope that this Article will facilitate participation by legal
scholars in future behavioral public choice research. Much remains to be
learned. In particular, future research should seek to provide stronger empirical
evidence linking particular types of irrationality to the adoption of bad laws.
Future research should also focus on improving the various proposals for
reducing the effects of irrationality on the law. For example, those who argue in
favor of greater reliance on bureaucrats and other experts have yet to
demonstrate that the benefits of such reliance outweigh the costs. Nonetheless,
there may be ways to reduce the problems presented by expert decision making
and thereby to improve at least some areas of policy.

